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Introduction
Seldom, very seldom, does complete truth belong to any human
disclosure; seldom can it happen that something is not a little dis-
guised, or a little mistaken.
Jane Austen, Emma (1815)
COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN CLIENTS and attorneys are the
cornerstone of the attorney-client relationship. Because the vast ma-
jority of civil and criminal trials settle and plea-bargain, respectively,"
many clients never actually enter the courtroom, interact with a judge
or a jury, or meet the opposing party or its attorney.2 Consequently,
for a good number of Americans, communicating with their own law-
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1. See Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know
(and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4
(1983) (offering empirical support to the fact that the vast majority of civil suits settle);
Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settle-
ments, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1339 (1994). Indeed, Prof. Clermont concludes that "settlement is
... much more important than actual litigation.... [A]s settlement has blossomed, the
civil trial has all but disappeared recently, without any clear single cause. The percentage
of filed federal cases that see trial is now dropping toward 1.5%, and state trials too have
dropped off." KEVIN M. CLERMONT, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 415 (2005). Similarly, a
majority of criminal prosecutions end in plea-bargain. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE STATISTICS 419, 423 (Ann L. Pastore & Kathleen Maguire
eds., 1999); see also F. Andrew Hessick III & Reshma Saujani, Plea Bargaining and Convicting
the Innocent: The Role of the Prosecutor, the Defense Counsel, and the Judge, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. 189,
189 (2002).
2. Similarly, many business transactions and negotiations are handled to a significant
extent by lawyers; the clients often meet only for the ceremonial closing.
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yers will constitute most, if not all, of their exposure to law and the
legal system. Communications between clients and their own attor-
neys thus become the main arena in which clients gain any experience
with lawyers and the law. 3
Conceptually, the attorney-client relationship is an agency rela-
tionship in which a lawyer-agent serves the interests of a client-princi-
pal.4 Communications are the mechanism by which the client controls
the agency relationship, informs the attorney about his goals and
objectives, and provides the lawyer with necessary and relevant infor-
mation about the representation. Successful representation requires
effective communications, without which the attorney-agent cannot
know, understand, or represent the client's goals.5
Given the inherent importance of attorney-client communica-
tions, it is surprising that little case law and few ethics opinions di-
rectly explore this core issue. Instead, communications often make a
guest appearance as an afterthought or a tack-on to other, more "im-
portant" issues addressed in a case. Moreover, there are hardly any
academic studies of communications. 6 Equally surprising is the little
attention historically given to communications in the legal profes-
3. The unfortunate fact that failure to communicate is one of most common areas
about which clients complain year after year is evidence of the importance of communica-
tions to the client. See, e.g., Diane M. Ellis, A Decade of Diversion: Empirical Evidence that Alter-
native Discipline is WorkmngforArizona Lawyers, 52 EMORY L.J. 1221, 1269 (2003). See Am. Bar
Ass'n, Survey on Lawyer Discipline Systems, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/discipline/sold/
home.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2008) for a comprehensive statistical survey of lawyer disci-
pline systems.
4. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS Ch. 2, Introductory Note
(2000) ("The subject of this Chapter is, from one point of view, derived from the law of
agency. It concerns a voluntary arrangement in which an agent, a lawyer, agrees to work for
the benefit of a principal, a client."); see also Dunkley v. Shoemate, 515 S.E.2d 442, 444
(N.C. 1999) ("North Carolina law has long recognized that an attorney-client relationship
is based upon principles of agency .... ."); In re Estate of Maslowski, 561 N.E.2d 1183, 1186
(Ill. App. Ct. 1990) ("The law of principal and agent is generally applicable to the relation
of attorney and client."); State ex rel. A.M.T. v. Weinstein, 411 S.W.2d 267, 272 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1967) ("The rules of law applicable to principal and agent control the relation be-
tween an attorney and his clients."); Schwarze v. May Dep't Stores, 360 S.W.2d 336, 338
(Mo. Ct. App. 1962) ("[T]he relation between attorney and client is highly fiduciary in its
nature and in a limited and dignified sense it is essentially that of principal and agent.").
5. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (2007); see infra notes 36-46 and
accompanying text.
6. The legal ethics list-serve posted a comprehensive list of current legal ethics
casebooks. Posting of John Steele, legalethics-bounces@plists.washlaw.edu, to http://
lists.washlaw.edu/mailman/listinfo/legalethics (Oct. 20, 2006) (on file with author).
Whereas confidentiality and conflicts of interest, for example, are consistently explored at
length, a majority of the casebooks have little to no in-depth coverage of communications.
But see DOUGLAS ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? (1974).
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sion's codes of professional conduct. Prior to 1983, the Canons and
subsequently American Bar Association Model Code of Professional
Conduct featured no attorney-client communications rule.7 The
American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct
("Rules") promulgated a fairly cryptic communications rule,8 which
was somewhat expanded in 2003.9
At first glance, however, it seems that the Rules, and the legal
profession, are moving in the right direction of focusing on and re-
quiring that more attention be given to communications between at-
torneys and clients. Generally, the Rules are perceived as having
adopted a new client-centered approach compared with the Model
Code. 10 With regard to communications, current Rule 1.411 is the
most detailed communications rule ever contained in codes of profes-
sional conduct. The Ethics 2000 reform also introduced a new de-
7. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 164 (1986) ("The 1969 Code failed
to address attorney-client communications, which remained unaddressed until the ABA
promulgated the 1983 Model Rules."). Canon 8 of the American Bar Association Canon of
Professional Ethics stated in relevant part that "A lawyer should endeavor to obtain full
knowledge of his client's cause before advising thereon . . . ." MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY Canon 8 (1908). The Model Code did contain two "ethical considerations"
dealing with some aspects of communications. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY
EC 7-8 (1969) ("A lawyer should exert his best efforts to insure that decisions of his client
are made only after the client has been informed of relevant considerations."); id. at EC 9-2
("In order to avoid misunderstandings and hence to maintain confidence, a lawyer should
fully and promptly inform his client of material developments in the matters being han-
dled for the client.").
8. The Rule stated:
(a) A Lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter
and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit
the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (1983).
9. Id. at R. 1.4 (2007). In 1997, the ABA established the Ethics 2000 Commission,
charging it with comprehensively reviewing the Rules. One of the primary reasons behind
the decision to revisit the Rules was the growing disparity in state ethics codes. Another
reason was the emergence of new issues raised by the influence that technological develop-
ments were having on the delivery of legal services. The ABA House of Delegates adopted
the proposed changes in late 2002. See E. Norman Veasey, Chair's Introduction at the
American Bar Association's Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Prof'l Conduct
("Ethics 2000") (Aug. 2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/e2k-chair-in-
tro.html.
10. Jason Kilborn, Who's in Charge Here?: Putting Clients in Their Place, 37 GA. L. REv. 1,
39 (2002) ("The Model Rules signaled a definite shift in the mindset of the late twentieth
century legal profession toward client empowerment .... ."); see also Robert D. Dinerstein,
Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 ARIz. L. REv. 501 (1990); Katherine
R. Kruse, Fortress in the Sand: The Plural Values of Client-Centered Representation, 12 CLINICAL L.
REV. 369 (2006).
11. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4.
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manding concept of informed consent 12 and expanded Rule 1.13,13
which deals with communications with an organizational client. 14
This Article argues that the Rules still need significant improve-
ment and should adopt a materiality-based communications rule that
would ensure that clients receive all information a reasonable client
would consider relevant to making decisions regarding the attorney-
client relationship. Part I establishes that the communications regime
orchestrated by the Rules, while purporting to be client-centered, is in
fact intentionally designed to create a one-way street. This design sys-
tematically channels information in the attorney-client relationship in
the lawyer's direction, while often leaving the client in the dark. Part
II proves that this asymmetric distribution of information in the attor-
ney-client relationship is without good reason from the client's point
of view. It is instead grounded in the lawyer's self-interest and in a
paternalistic approach that fails to take communications, and there-
fore clients, seriously. Part III proposes a new communications regime
that takes clients seriously by mandating disclosure of all material in-
formation to clients.
12. Id. at R. 1.0(e) cmts. 6, 7; see, e.g., Jay Katz, Informed Consent-A Fairy Tale? Law's
Vision, 39 U. PITr. L. REv. 137 (1977); Susan R. Martyn, Informed Consent in the Practice of
Law, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 307 (1980);Judith L. Maute, Allocation of Decisionmaking Author-
ity Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 17 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 1049 (1984); Gary A.
Munneke & Theresa E. Loscalzo, The Lawyer's Duty to Keep Clients Informed: Establishing a
Standard of Care in Professional Liability Actions, 9 PACE L. REV. 391 (1989); Cornelius J. Peck,
A New Tort Liability for Lack of Informed Consent in Legal Matters, 44 LA. L. REv. 1289 (1984);
Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE. L.J. 899 (1994); Mark Spiegel, Lawy-
ering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 41
(1979) [hereinafter Spiegel, Langenng and Client Decisionmaking]; Mark Spiegel, The New
Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Lawyer-Client Decisionmaking and the Role of Rules in Struc-
turing the Lanryer-Client Dialogue, 1980 Am. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1003 [hereinafter Spiegel, The
New Model Rules]; Marcy Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of Attorney-Client Relationship: The
Argument for Autonomy, 65 N.C. L. REV. 315, 318 (1987).
13. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.13.
14. Id. Rule 1.13 followed Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("Act"),
which set minimum standards for attorneys appearing and practicing before the Securities
and Exchange Commission ("SEC"). Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307, 116 Stat. 745 (2002)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002)). The Act required attorneys who rep-
resent issuers to report violations of securities law or fiduciary duties by the issuer "up-the-
ladder" to the highest corporate authority within the client-issuer. Id. The SEC, pursuant to
the Act, promulgated implementing rules. See SEC Standards of Professional Conduct for
Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before the Commission in the Representation of an
Issuer, 17 C.F.R. § 205 (2002).
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I. The Asymmetric Distribution of Information in the
Attorney-Client Relationship
The attorney-client relationship is commonly described as an
agency relationship. 15 The client-principal is in charge of the relation-
ship and has ultimate authority over determining the objectives of the
representation. 16 The lawyer-agent is an advisor regarding the ends
and a facilitator regarding the means by which the client-established
goals are to be pursued.' 7 The lawyer-agent is neither legally liable nor
morally accountable for the goals and consequences of the represen-
tation.' 8 This account of the attorney-client relationship features both
the client and the attorney in a very favorable light: first, the client is
presented as an autonomous individual acting reasonably on an in-
formed basis and empowered to control his own destiny; second, the
lawyer is portrayed as providing a socially valuable service and, conve-
niently, fulfilling a role that mandates that she be non-accountable for
the consequences she helps bring about.1 9
15. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
16. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a). Rule 1.2(a) states that "a lawyer shall
abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation." Id. Comment [1]
of Rule 1.2, exploring the allocation of authority between client and lawyer, provides that
"[p]aragraph (a) confers upon the client the ultimate authority to determine the purposes
to be served by legal representation, within the limits imposed by law and the lawyer's
professional obligations." Id. at R. 1.2 cmt. 1.
17. Id. at R. 1.2(a). In relevant part, the Rule states: "[A] lawyer.., shall consult with
the client as to the means by which [the client's objectives] are to be pursued." Id.
18. Id. at R. 1.2(b). The Rule states: "A lawyer's representation of a client, including
representation by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the client's politi-
cal, economic, social or moral views or activities." Id. Comment [5] further clarifies that
"[I] egal representation should not be denied to people.., whose cause is controversial or
the subject of popular disapproval. By the same token, representing a client does not con-
stitute approval of the client's views or activities." Id. at R. 1.2 cmt. 5. Murray Schwartz
coined the term the "principle of non-accountability" to mean that lawyers are not morally
accountable for the client's choice of ends and means. See Murray Schwartz, The Profession-
alism and Accountability of Laryers, 66 CAL. L. REV. 669, 672-75 (1978). Nathan Crystal ar-
gues even more forcefully that pursuant to the principle of non-accountability lawyers are
"neither legally, professionally, nor morally accountable for the means used or the ends
achieved." NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 620 (1996); see also DAVID
LUBAN, LAWYERS ANDJUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 148-74 (1988) (criticizing the principle of
non-accountability for protecting lawyers from moral culpability for their clients' conduct);
DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 19-64 (2007).
19. Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem, and Some
Possibilities, 1986 Am. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613 (arguing that lawyers' non-accountable, even
amoral, role is desirable because it serves clients' autonomy and "first-class citizenship"); see
also STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE 45 (1984)
("[T]he adversary process assigns each participant a single function .... Counsel is to act
as a zealous advocate.... [W]hen each actor performs only a single function the dispute
before the court will be resolved in the fairest and most efficient way," thus providing a
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Although empowering for clients and self-serving for lawyers, this
tale of a dominant client and a helpful attorney is not an accurate
depiction of many attorney-client relationships. Providing a legal
description of the attorney-client relationship as an agency relation-
ship does not in reality render the client a powerful principal and
does not reduce the lawyer to a mere obedient agent. To the contrary,
many attorney-client relationships feature a powerful lawyer who
dominates the relationship and paternalistically instructs her vulnera-
ble client regarding his own best interests, and a submissive client who
often defers to his attorney regarding both the means and the objec-
tives of the relationship.20 The "one size fits all" approach evident in
Rule 1.2, according to which all clients are uniformly treated as power-
ful principals and lawyers as serving agents, ignores the reality of dif-
ferent contexts and varying relationships in which some clients are
quite vulnerable and some attorneys quite powerful. 21
Heinz & Laumann's seminal empirical studies are instructive in
exploring whether agency language can be applied to practice reali-
ties. 22 These studies found that lawyers work in two distinct hemi-
spheres, individual and corporate.23 The agency analysis, depicting an
authoritative principal-client and a servient agent-attorney, seems to
better fit the corporate sphere, where corporate clients tend to be
more sophisticated and powerful vis-A-vis their attorneys. The agency
analysis does not fit as well in the individual sphere, where individual
clients tend to be less informed and more likely to defer to their
lawyers. 24
justification for both lawyers' role and their non-accountability for the consequences of
their conduct pursuant to such a role). But see David Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative: A
Response to Stephen Pepper, 1986 Am. B. FOUND. RES. J. 637 (criticizing the autonomy-based
defense of lawyers' role-morality and the principle of non-accountability).
20. Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 Hum. RTs. 1, 19
(1975).
21. See David B. Wilkins, Everyday Practice is the Troubling Case, in EVERYDAY PRACTICES
AND TROUBLE CASES 68, 70-75 (Austin Sarat ed., 1998) [hereinafter Wilkins, Everyday Prac-
tice]; see also David B. Wilkins, Legal Realismfor Lawyers, 104 HARv. L. REv. 468 (1990) [here-
inafter Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers].
22. JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE
OF THE BAR (1982);JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAwYERs: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF
THE BAR (2005).
23. HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 22, at 37-54; HEINZ ET AL., supra note 22, at 29-47.
24. The fact that the corporate sphere better fits the agency assumptions about the
allocation of authority within the attorney-client relationship is both surprising and ironic.
It is surprising because in the corporate sphere the paradigmatic attorney is often a large
law firm whereas in the individual sphere the typical attorney is a solo practitioner. And
yet, the seemingly less powerful solo practitioner often has more power vis-A-vis her individ-
ual client, than the large corporate law firm has vis-a-vis its corporate client. Consequently,
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Within the individual sphere, the imbalance rendering the attor-
ney more powerful than the client is, in part, a reflection of the rela-
tive identities and characteristics of the parties, as well as social and
professional status disparities between them. Relative to her client, the
lawyer tends to hale from a high socio-economic background, benefits
from at least seven years of college and graduate education, and en-
joys high social, cultural, and financial status.25 Conversely, the client,
at least in the individual sphere and relative to his attorney, tends to
be of a lower socio-economic, cultural, and educational background.
26
Furthermore, whereas the lawyer enters the relationship to do her
job-providing legal services 7-the client enters it to pursue impor-
tant values and interests. Perhaps most tellingly, the disparity within
the relationship is a consequence of the circumstances under which it
is created: a client comes to see an attorney when he faces a problem
and when he needs help. Notwithstanding the fact that the details of
while one might expect clients in the individual sphere to be more powerful vis-a-vis their
lawyers, they are, after all, dealing with solo practitioners and not with large law firms; it is
instead often corporate clients who are able to act as powerful principals, vis-A-vis their
corporate attorneys. The insight is ironic because the agency assumptions and the non-
accountability principle that follows are justified in terms of enhancing client autonomy.
To the extent that corporate clients are more likely to be in a position to meaningfully
occupy the role of principals, one might wonder how such clients exercise and benefit
from individually-based notions of autonomy. See Steven L. Pepper, Applying the Fundamen-
tals of Lawyers' Ethics to Insurance Defense Practice, 4 CONN. INSUR. L.J. 27, 45 (1997) (noting
that "less elite lawyers" representing individual clients are likely to be powerful vis-A-vis
their "less powerful clients" and that such clients are in need of protection).
The gap between the agency language depicting the client as a powerful principal and
practice realities, at least in the individual sphere, in which the client is often in a weak
position in relation to his attorney, however, should not be a ground for dismissing the
agency assumptions and the non-accountability principle that follows it. Arguably, the
agency language is meant to be normative, not descriptive. It states the ideal of treating all
clients as principals, and to the extent that in reality clients are not in such a position, it
states the standard to be pursued. Importantly, the Rules are based on the assumption that
some clients are vulnerable vis-a-vis their lawyers and in need of protection, the very protec-
tion purportedly granted them in the Rules. See generally LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAwYERS' PRAC-
TICES-TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds.,
1992).
25. See, e.g., HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 22, at 37-54, 127-75. de Tocqueville's ob-
servation, nearly two centuries ago that America has no aristocracy but for members of the
legal profession rings true today as it did in the ninteenth century. See ALEXIS DE Toc-
QUEVILLE, I DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 278-80 (Alfred A. Knopf ed., Everyman's Library
1994) (1835).
26. HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 22, at 37-54, 127-75.
27. In contrast, Charles Fried provides an account of the lawyer not as a service pro-
vider performing ajob, but rather as her client's friend. Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend:
The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976).
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the client's ordeal will often be embarrassing, the client will have to
discuss them in detail with a stranger, the attorney.
Given that the power inequity within the relationship is the result
of these "natural" factors inherent to an attorney-client relationship,
28
one would expect the Rules to work towards closing the gap and em-
powering clients to allow them to live up to the principal ideal envi-
sioned in the agency language. In actuality, however, these Rules-the
very same Rules that posit the client as a dominant principal and the
lawyer as a facilitating agent-instead put in place an apparatus that is
meant to transfer power in the relationship from clients to attorneys.
Moreover, the pro-lawyer imbalance in the attorney-client relationship
is, in part, a result brought about by the Rules. Specifically, the Rules
make lawyers the locus of information in the relationship, creating a
pro-lawyer disparity in the attorney-client relationship. 29 The Rules de-
sign information within the attorney-client relationship to flow along a
one-way street, from the client to the attorney. The Rules thus system-
atically create an asymmetric distribution of information within the
relationship, which ensures the lawyer's dominant role vis-A-vis the
client.
The following sections explore the asymmetric distribution of in-
formation in the attorney-client relationship. Section A explores the
initial distribution of information between attorney and client, offer-
ing a typology of the various facts that constitute the body of informa-
tion within the attorney-client relationship. Section B details how the
Rules encourage the transfer of all relevant information from clients
28. The factors are only natural to a degree. The identity of the paradigmatic attorney
is, of course, socially construed. Lawyers tend to hale from a high socio-economic back-
ground in part because private legal education is prohibitively expensive. Lawyers benefit
from years of education because most states require a law degree as a condition precedent
for the practice of law, and they enjoy high status because in our legalistic culture lawyers
are often perceived as the high-priests of a civic religion. See Robert W. Gordon, "The Ideal
and the Actual in the Law": Fantasies and Practices of New York City Lawyers, 1879-1910, in THE
NEW HIGH PRIESTS-LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 51, 61 (Gerard W. Gawalt ed.,
1984). Similarly, the design of the relationship is a product of social and cultural construc-
tion. Law is spoken and practiced in a non-native language. Legalese is an acquired skill
that intends to exclude non-lawyers from speaking and practicing law. See generally
DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE-REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION
(2000) for a provocative detailed account of a possible parallel legal universe, which will
not be as foreign and alienating to clients.
29. The common reference to the relationship as the attorney-client relationship,
rather than the client-attorney relationship, seems to imply that primary ownership of the
relationship, and authority over it, vests with the lawyer. See generally MILNER S. BALL, LYING
DoWN TOGETHER: LAw, METAPHOR AND THEOLOGY (1985) (discussing the powerful role of
semantics and rhetoric in legal scholarship).
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to attorneys. Section C establishes that the Rules discourage lawyers
from sharing all relevant information with their clients.
A. Information Within the Attorney-Client Relationship: A New
Proposed Typology
At the commencement of an attorney-client relationship, the cli-
ent typically possesses all or most of the relevant facts regarding the
matter and the lawyer typically possesses all or most of the knowledge
about the law. Of course, some clients who are repeat-players30 and
regular consumers of legal information might possess some relevant
legal knowledge.31 Similarly, some specialized lawyers with experience
in particular industries might possess some relevant factual informa-
tion, but clients will naturally possess more complete and accurate
facts regarding the particulars of their specific matters. Inherently,
therefore, information in the attorney-client relationship is distrib-
uted asymmetrically-lawyers possess most of the legal knowledge and
clients possess most of the facts.
If the goal of the Rules was to ensure effective representation and
to empower clients by installing them as powerful principals within
the relationship, one would expect the communication Rules to en-
sure the effective exchange of these rather distinct types of informa-
tion between attorneys and clients. Specifically, one would expect the
Rules to put in place a communication apparatus pursuant to which
clients would share with their attorneys all relevant facts about the
matter, and lawyers would communicate to their clients all relevant
legal knowledge applicable to the matter. Such an exchange would
allow clients to exercise their authority over the relationship and de-
termine its goals and objectives on an informed basis, while allowing
attorneys to effectively represent their clients.
The communication Rules, however, institute an altogether dif-
ferent apparatus-one that is aimed not at closing the "inherent"
asymmetry of information that typically exists in attorney-client rela-
tionships, but rather at widening the asymmetry and ensuring the law-
yer's dominance over the client within the relationship. To
30. Marc Galanter, Why the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 95, 97-114 (1974).
31. The standard assumption regarding professionals, however, is that they possess a
body of esoteric knowledge, vis-A-vis their lay clients, which makes their services valuable.
TALCOTr PARSONS, The Professions and Social Structure, in ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 33,
35-37 (rev. ed. 1954); see also Wasserstrom, supra note 20, at 1-4 (identifying esoteric
knowledge as a characteristic of professionalism).
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understand the Rules' asymmetric architecture, one must abandon
the simplistic distinction between facts and law and instead study the
universe of information within the attorney-client relationship as con-
sisting of three categories: "representation-specific" facts, "meta" facts,
and "set-up" facts. 3 2
"Representation-specific" facts denote all information relating di-
rectly to the attorney-client relationship. They include facts about the
underlying events giving rise to the matter, which the client will nor-
mally possess, and legal knowledge applicable to the matter, which the
attorney will normally possess. In addition, they include quasi-legal in-
formation, such as enforcement policies of the law, and non-legal facts
such as information about the relevant industry, which either attorney
or client may possess.
"Meta" facts denote all background and personal information re-
garding the client and the lawyer. Meta facts regarding a client in-
clude facets of his identity, such as race, gender, ethnicity, socio-
economic status, culture, religion, and sexual-orientation. Meta infor-
mation also includes his level of comprehension and sophistication,
ability to perform under pressure, and responsiveness to legal ad-
vice. 33 Meta information regarding an individual attorney includes
where she went to college and law school, how many times she took
the bar exam before passing it, her experience and expertise, reputa-
tion, whether she has ever been disciplined or found liable for mal-
practice, whether she carries malpractice liability coverage, how the
attorney plans on exercising her professional judgment and discretion
in revealing confidential client information, as well as personal infor-
mation about the lawyer.3 4
"Set-up" facts denote information relating to the structure of the
relationship between the attorney and the client itself, rather than to
its substance. For instance, set-up facts include information about
forming, maintaining, and dissolving the relationship, resolving dis-
putes should they arise, and the extent of post-termination duties.
32. To be sure, the author's proposed typology-representation-specific, meta, and
set-up facts-replaces the common distinction between facts and law, which is based upon
the identity of the person possessing the information (i.e., the client knows the facts, the
attorney knows the law), with a characterization based upon the nature of the information
in question. See Maute, supra note 12, at 1115 (offering a typology based on representation
context, decision type, client identity, and timing).
33. Meta facts regarding an entity client would include information about its govern-
ance structure and culture, relationships within the entity, as well as information about the
industry and business competitors.
34. Meta facts regarding a law firm would include information about its size, organiza-
tion, culture, and reputation.
Moreover, set-up facts include information relating to the client's abil-
ity to pay legal fees, as well as information about the fee structure and
resolution of fee disputes relating to the attorney-client relationship.35
This typology of information within the attorney-client relation-
ship illuminates how the Rules design a communications regime that
is intentionally a one-way street, systematically biased against clients
and in favor of lawyers. As demonstrated below, by regulating the flow
of information from clients to lawyers, the Rules foster a "tell all" atti-
tude encouraging clients to disclose all three types of facts-represen-
tation-specific, meta, and set-up-to their attorneys. In regulating the
flow of information from lawyers to clients, however, the Rules do not
provide lawyers similar incentives. Lawyers are only encouraged to re-
veal to clients limited representation-specific and set-up facts, and
generally no meta facts. Consequently, the Rules fail to close the in-
herent asymmetric gap in information between lawyers and clients.
The Rules also aggravate the asymmetry by systematically channeling
information from clients to lawyers and making it less likely that cli-
ents will be able to occupy the role of informed principals in the attor-
ney-client relationship.
B. Regulation of Information Flow from Clients to Attorneys-The
"Tell All" Regime
No rule directly regulates the transmission of information from a
client to a lawyer, in part because the Rules are aimed at lawyers, not
at clients.3 6 Rule 1.6 ' 7 however, which deals with confidentiality, im-
plicitly regulates such communications. Rule 1.6(a) states generally
35. This typology of facts depends on the particular circumstances in which they arise.
In other words, the three categories of facts are fluid in the sense that a particular fact may,
over time, change its "type." For instance, the way an attorney may exercise her discretion
as to whether and when to reveal confidential client information pursuant to Rule 1.6, or
whether an attorney carries malpractice coverage, are generally meta facts. If an attorney,
however, in the context of representing a client is actually contemplating revealing confi-
dential information or if a client is about to file a malpractice claim against her attorney,
both facts become representation-specific. Similarly, a set-up fact, such as the circum-
stances under which an attorney might reasonably raise her fees during the representation,
might become a representation-specific fact if an attorney is actually thinking about raising
her fees.
36. Some lawyers do provide clients with a "Client Bill of Rights" which specifies the
client's rights and duties and offers guidance regarding appropriate client conduct. At
least two states, New York and Colorado, require or encourage lawyers to provide clients
with a Client Bill of Rights at the outset of the representation. See Fred C. Zacharias, Recon-
ciling Professionalism and Client Interests, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1303, 1367 (1995) (discuss-
ing the benefits of requiring lawyers to provide a Client Bill of Rights).
37. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2007).
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that all information relating to the representation is confidential and
cannot be disclosed without the client's informed consent.38 The
Comment to Rule 1.6 explains that confidentiality is essential to en-
sure complete and effective communication between attorney and cli-
ent, without which the lawyer is unable to effectively represent the
clienti 9 The doctrine of confidentiality encourages clients to reveal
all facts to lawyers by ensuring clients that whatever they disclose will
be protected.
Importantly, Rule 1.6(a)'s "information relating to the represen-
tation" is construed broadly to extend protection to representation-
specific, meta, and set-up facts. Rule 1.6 is, by design, very broad in
terms of both its scope and the extent of the protection it offers. It
covers all information relating to the representation, as well as infor-
mation that, while not in and of itself confidential, might reasonably
lead to the revelation of confidential information. 40 The protection it
grants confidential information is complete-once information is
deemed confidential, a lawyer cannot reveal it unless an applicable
exception applies. 41
The broad scope of confidentiality is evidenced by the narrow
exceptions to it. The only mandatory exception to confidentiality is
embodied in Rule 3.3(b).42 Otherwise, the exceptions to confidential-
ity are all permissive 43 and frowned upon by the bar. This near fetish
of confidentiality44 has been the subject of a substantial body of schol-
arship and bitter battles between supporters and critics of the doc-
trine.45 For purposes of this Article, suffice it to simply note that one
38. Id. at R. 1.6(a).
39. Id. at R. 1.6 cmt. 2.
40. Id. at cmt. 4.
41. See generally Eli Wald, Lawyer Mobility and Legal Ethics: Resolving the Tension Between
Confidentiality and Contemporary Lawyers' Career Paths, 31 J. LEGAL PROF. 199, 203-07 (2007)
(exploring the broad scope and extent of protection extended by Rule 1.6).
42. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(b). Only Rule 3.3(b), dealing with can-
dor toward the tribunal, constitutes a true mandatory exception to confidentiality, stating
that "a lawyer ... shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclo-
sure to the tribunal," if the client commits perjury. Id. Rule 3.3(a)(3) also requires the
taking of "remedial measures" but a lawyer may avoid the need to disclose confidential
information by refusing to offer false evidence. Id. at R. 3.3(a)(3).
43. Rules 1.6(b) and 1.13(c) use the word "may" to grant attorneys the discretion to
reveal confidential information. Id. at R. 1.6(b), 1.13(c). Rule 4.1(b) mandates disclosure
of material facts to third parties in some circumstances unless the information is confiden-
tial. Id. at R. 4.1(b).
44. William H. Simon, The Confidentiality Fetish, ATLANTIc MONrHLY, Dec. 2004, at
113-16.
45. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1998)
(denouncing confidentiality as a doctrine mainly serving the interests of lawyers and the
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important outcome of broad confidentiality is that it implicitly en-
courages a client to "tell all" to his attorney. By casting the net of con-
fidentiality so broadly and extending confidential information broad
protection, Rule 1.6 encourages the client to reveal all information
within his possession to his attorney. To be sure, the broad construc-
tion of confidentiality covers representation-specific, meta, and set-up
facts because all fall within the category of "information relating to
the representation. '" 4 6
C. Regulation of Information Flow from Attorneys to Clients-
The "Say as Little as Necessary" Regime
Rule 1.247 sets the stage for communications by affirming the re-
lational roles of the client as the ultimate decision-maker and the at-
torney as the agent. It states that the client is solely responsible for
determining the objectives of the relationship.48 The lawyer, in con-
sultation with the client, is responsible for the means by which the
goals are to be pursued.49 The Rule then makes an explicit reference
to Rule 1.4 as the venue for regulating communications consistent
with the allocation of authority pursuant to Rule 1.2.50
The allocation of authority envisioned by the Rules, rendering
the client the decision-maker within the relationship, might create an
expectation of a broad communications rule directing all relevant
types of information-representation-specific, meta, and set-up
facts-from attorney to client. Rule 1.4, however, in large part actually
only covers representation-specific facts. 5 1
legal profession). But see Lawrence J. Fox, It Takes More Than Cheek to Lose Our Way, 77 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 277 (2003) (offering a fierce defense of a broad confidentiality rule).
46. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a). To be clear, the author's proposed
definition of representation-specific facts is narrower than Rule 1.6's construction of "in-
formation relating to the representation." See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
47. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2.
48. Id. at R. 1.2(a) cmt. 1.
49. Id. at R. 1.2(a).
50. "[A] lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of repre-
sentation and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by which
they are to be pursued." Id. (emphasis added). Comment [1] adds:
The decisions specified in paragraph (a), such as whether to settle a civil matter,
must also be made by the client. See Rule 1. 4 (a)(1) for the lawyer's duty to communicate
with the client about such decisions. With respect to the means by which the client's
objectives are to be pursued, the lawyer shall consult with the client as required by Rule
1.4(a)(2) and may take such action as is impliedly authorized to carry out the
representation.
Id. at R. 1.2 cmt. 1 (emphasis added).
51. Id. at R. 1.4.
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In proving that Rule 1.4 is generally silent regarding meta and
set-up facts, one needs to distinguish between subsections (a) (1) and
(a) (5), which generally do not deal with meta and set-up facts; subsec-
tions (a) (2) and (a) (4), which could be plausibly read to deal with
meta facts; and subsections (a) (3) and (b), which could be plausibly
read to regulate meta and set-up facts. 52 These latter subsections, how-
ever, should not be construed as such.
1. Subsections 1.4(a)(1) and 1.4(a)(5)
Subsection 1.4(a) (1) mandates communicating with the client
when his informed consent is required. 53 Informed consent is re-
quired by the Rules about a dozen times, generally in circumstances
regarding representation-specific facts.54 Rule 1.5 55 is the only in-
stance in which informed consent is required regarding set-up facts
relating to contingency fees and fee division.5 6 No Rule requires in-
formed consent with regard to meta facts.
Subsection 1.4(a) (5) deals with representation-specific facts and
does not apply to meta or set-up facts.57 A client may expect assistance
that is "not permitted by the Rules or other law" in either one of two
situations: (1) when the client does not know the assistance is in viola-
tion of the Rules or other law, or (2) when the client knows of the
potential violation but nonetheless seeks the lawyer's assistance. Ei-
52. Rule 1.4 reads:
(a) A lawyer shall:
(1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to
which the client's informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(e), is required by
these Rules;
(2) reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client's objec-
tives are to be accomplished;
(3) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter;
(4) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and
(5) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer's conduct
when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the
Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit
the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.
Id.
53. Id. at R. 1.4(a)(1).
54. Informed consent is commonly invoked in the Rules either in connection with
waiving confidentiality, see i& at R. 1.6(a), 1.8(b), 1.18; or in connection with waiving con-
flicts of interest, see id at R. 1.7(b) (4), 1.8(a) (3), 1.8(f) (1), 1.8(g), 1.9(a) (b), 1.11 (a) (2),
1.11 (d) (2), 1.12(a).
55. Id. at R. 1.5.
56. Id. at R. 1.5(c), (e).
57. Id. at R. 1.4(a)(5).
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ther way, Rule 1.2(d) forbids the lawyer from providing the client with
such assistance, 58 and subsection 1.4(a) (5) complements Rule 1.2(d)
by instructing the lawyer to advise the client of such limitations. 59 Im-
portantly, subsection 1.4(a) (5) only mandates communication "when
the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance."60 Lawyers will typi-
cally have such actual knowledge with regard to specific client expec-
tations, which would render the facts in question representation-
specific.
2. Subsections 1.4(a)(2) and 1.4(a)(4)
Reading subsections 1.4(a) (2) and 1.4(a) (4) to cover anything
more than representation-specific facts is implausible. Subsection
1.4(a) (2), like subsection 1.4(a)(5), complements Rule 1.2(a). 61 Rule
1.2(a) draws the classic distinction between the goals and objectives of
the relationship, and the means by which those goals and objectives
are to be pursued.62 Rule 1.2(a) vests authority over the former solely
in the client and shared authority over the latter in both the lawyer
and the client.63 Subsection 1.4(a) (2) complements Rule 1.2(a) by in-
structing the lawyer to consult with the client regarding their shared
authority over the means by which the client's objectives are to be
pursued. 6 4
It might seem, however, that subsection 1.4(a) (2) could also ap-
ply to meta facts: whether a lawyer carries malpractice liability cover-
age, or explains to her client the circumstances under which she may
decide to exercise her discretion and disclose confidential informa-
tion pursuant to an exception, constitutes the means, or the back-
ground means, of pursuing the client's objectives. The Comments to
Rules 1.4 and 1.2 demonstrate why such a broad construction of
"means" would be implausible. Comment [3] to Rule 1.4 gives as an
58. Id. at R. 1.2(d).
59. Id. at R. 1.4(a)(5).
60. Id.
61. Seeid.atR. 1.4(a)(2).
62. Maute, supra note 12, at 1052 (describing the allocation of authority as a "joint
venture" in which "the client is principal with presumptive authority over the objectives of
representation and the lawyer is principal with presumptive authority over the means by
which those objectives are pursued"); Spiegel, Lauryering and Client Decisionmaking, supra
note 12, at 50; Strauss, supra note 12, at 318 (stating that the traditional allocation of deci-
sion-making authority vests decisions about "ends" in clients and decisions about "means"
in attorneys).
63. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 1.2(a).
64. Id. atR. 1.4(a)(2).
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example of "means," decisions that must be made during a trial.65
Comment [2] to Rule 1.2 gives the examples of "technical, legal and
tactical matters." 66 The Comments thus clarify that "means" are to be
construed in direct relation to the ends of the representation and do
not include background considerations such as the availability of mal-
practice insurance and the lawyer's general exercise of discretion re-
garding confidentiality. 67
Subsection 1.4(a) (4) regarding clients' "reasonable requests for
information" is not meant to cover meta facts, but rather to ensure the
prompt responsiveness to clients' reasonable inquires about represen-
tation-specific facts. 68 Indeed, the focus of subsection 1.4(a) (4) is on
diligence, that is, the timing, as opposed to the content, of the
response. 69
Subsection 1.4(a) (4), however, could trigger discussion of meta
facts if the client directly asks the lawyer about such information. For
example, at the outset of the representation the client may ask the
lawyer whether she passed the bar exam on the first try or whether she
carries malpractice liability coverage. Arguably, even if asked directly
about meta facts, the lawyer need not respond on the ground that the
request is unreasonable and does not concern the relationship. Com-
ment [4] to Rule 1.4 states in relevant part: "When a client makes a
reasonable request for information, however, paragraph (a) (4) requires
prompt compliance with the request .... 70 The Comment thus sug-
gests that the subject matter of subsection 1.4(a) (4) is limited to rea-
sonable requests. An attorney might argue that whether she passed
the bar exam on the first attempt is simply not related to and does not
concern the relationship and, therefore, such a request is unreasona-
ble and need not be responded to. 71
Notably, even if one interprets the subsection to mean that an
attorney must disclose meta facts when the client explicitly requests
such information, it does not address the issue of whether the attor-
65. Id. at R. 1.4 cmt. 3.
66. Id. at R. 1.2 cmt. 2.
67. Indeed, even if meta facts, such as the availability of malpractice insurance, are
tangentially related to the means by which the client's objectives are to be pursued, it is
precisely that tangential nature of the information that would fail to meet the "reasonably
consult" requirement of subsection 1.4(a) (2).
68. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a) (4).
69. Comment [4], for example, states in relevant part that "[cjlient telephone calls
should be promptly returned or acknowledged." Id at R. 1.4 cmt. 4.
70. Id. (emphasis added).
71. Of course, an attorney may not lie to the client about meta facts, and, practically
speaking, failure to respond to the client's query may cause the client some pause.
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ney must disclose such information when the client does not request
it.72 Subsection 1.4(a) (4) clearly does not mandate nor encourage dis-
closure of meta facts to clients.
3. Subsection 1.4(a)(3)
Subsection 1.4(a) (3), which requires the lawyer to keep the client
reasonably informed as to the status of the matter,73 could plausibly
be read to mandate communication of meta and set-up facts because
information such as whether an attorney carries malpractice insur-
ance coverage may be construed as being included in the meaning of
"matter." Comment [3], however, seems to construe the "status of the
matter" narrowly, whereby "matter" means the specific subject matter
of the representation. 74 The Comment gives the example of "signifi-
cant developments affecting the timing or substance of the represen-
tation."75 It is hard to see how information about whether the attorney
passed the bar exam on the first try might affect the "timing or sub-
stance" of the representation. Moreover, the Comment refers to "sig-
nificant developments. ' 76 Whether the attorney passed the bar exam
or whether she carried malpractice coverage at the inception of the
relationship are static facts, not "developments" per Comment [3].
Some meta facts, however, can in some circumstances constitute
"significant developments" per subsection 1.4(a) (3). For example, the
fact of an attorney's falling out of malpractice coverage during the
representation could affect the substance of the relationship, because
the attorney, now without coverage, might prefer more conservative
avenues of representation less likely to result in malpractice lawsuits.
Similarly, the fact of a new disciplinary investigation launched against
an attorney can constitute a significant development if it restricts the
ability of the attorney to represent a client.
Subsection 1.4(a) (3) covers meta facts only when circumstances
render the information specific with regard to the particulars of the
representation. That is, subsection 1.4(a) (3) makes disclosure to cli-
ents mandatory if and when the information stops being generic meta
information and becomes representation-specific information. 77 The
key issue is thus not how broadly the word "matter" is to be construed,
72. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 1.4(a)(4).
73. Id. at R. 1.4(a)(3).
74. Id. at R. 1.4 cmt. 3.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See supra note 35.
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but rather the nature of the information involved. Even if disclosure
of meta facts could be forced under Rule 1.4(a), the communications
rule certainly does not encourage a free flow of information from law-
yers to their clients.
4. Subsection 1.4(b)
Subsection 1.4(b) governs how an attorney provides clients with
adequate explanations. The subsection plausibly regulates more than
representation-specific facts because meta facts seem "reasonably nec-
essary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation. '78 For example, whether an attorney carries malprac-
tice liability coverage may influence a potential client's decision as to
whether or not to retain the attorney. 79 Similarly, information about
pending disciplinary complaints and malpractice lawsuits against the
attorney may allow the client to draw an inference about the lawyer's
competence and qualifications, and thus impact his decision whether
to hire the lawyer.
Note, however, that subsection 1.4(b) does not require the lawyer
to explain information or facts "to the extent reasonably necessary to
permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the represen-
tation."8 0 Subsection 1.4(b) instead reads: "A lawyer shall explain a
matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make
informed decisions regarding the representation. '"8 1 The Comments,
as we have seen above in exploring subsection 1.4(a) (3), also construe
a "matter" narrowly to include a settlement or a plea offer, the deci-
sion to waive jury trial, and whether the client will testify.82
The combined effect of subsection 1.4(b) requiring an explana-
tion only about a "matter," and only "regarding the representation," is
to limit the scope of subsection 1.4(b) to representation-specific, as
opposed to meta, facts. Moreover, even if meta facts can be forced
upon the reading of a "matter," it is hard to see how the fact of mal-
practice insurance coverage, for instance, is a "matter". "reasonably
78. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4(b).
79. Nicole D. Mignone, The Emperor's New Clothes?: Cloaking Client Protection Under the
New Model Court Rule on Insurance Disclosure, 36 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1069, 1093 (2005) ("An
informed choice provides a client with sufficient 'information to make an intelligent
choice' ..... For some clients, knowing an attorney's malpractice insurance coverage, in
addition to other factors, could influence the ultimate decision to hire that attorney." (in-
ternal citation omitted)).
80. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4(b).
81. Id. (emphasis added).
82. Id. at R. 1.4 cmt. 2.
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necessary" to permit the client to make informed decisions about the
representation.8 3 Comment [5] states: "The client should have suffi-
cient information to participate intelligently in decisions concerning
the objectives of the representation .... "84 This suggests that subsec-
tion 1.4(b) does not cover meta facts. Meta information, such as the
lawyer's decision as to whether or not to carry coverage, does not con-
cern the specific objectives of the representation.
Comment [5] further notes that the guiding principle in assess-
ing the extent of explanation an attorney needs to provide is fulfilling
"reasonable client expectations for information consistent with the
duty to act in the client's best interests, and the client's overall re-
quirements as to the character of the representation."85 The question
thus becomes whether a client has a reasonable expectation to know
certain meta facts such as whether a lawyer carries malpractice cover-
age. The demanding elements of subsection 1.4(b) limit the reasona-
ble expectations of clients and shift the burden onto the client to
require information rather then encourage the attorney to provide it
forthright.
In conclusion, Rule 1.4 regulates mostly representation-specific
facts and minimally addresses meta and set-up information. Rule 1.4's
near-exclusive regulation of representation-specific facts and failure to
encourage a free flow of information from attorney to client marks a
very different approach than that of Rule 1.6, which reflects a "tell all"
approach promoting extensive communications from client to
attorney.8 6
Information transfer from attorney to client is regulated not only
by Rule 1.4, the so-called communications rule, but also by Rules
1.13,87 1.16,88 1.18,89 and 7.1-7.6,90 as well as all Rules requiring in-
formed consent. One approach to exploring these communications
rules is along the timeline of the relationship. Rules 1.18 and 7.1-7.6
regulate communications at the outset or pre-relationship phase.91
Rules 1.5,92 1.13,93 1.15,94 and the Rules requiring informed consent
83. Id. at R. 1.4(b).
84. Id. at R. 1.4 cmt. 5.
85. Id.
86. See id. at R. 1.6.
87. Id at R. 1.13.
88. Id, at R. 1.16.
89. Id. at R. 1.18.
90. Id. at R. 7.1-7.6.
91. See id. at R. 1.18, 7.1-7.6.
92. Id. at R. 1.5.
93. Id. at R. 1.13.
Winter 2008]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
regulate communications during the life of the relationship. 95 Rule
1.16 regulates communications at the post-relationship phase.9 6 Ex-
ploring the communication content of these Rules, however, using
the author's proposed typology of information within the attorney-cli-
ent relationship-representation-specific, meta, and set-up facts-will
further demonstrate that the Rules, as a whole, only require lawyers to
communicate a small subset of information to their clients, mostly
representation-specific facts.
9 7
5. Rule 1.13: Communicating with an Organizational Client
Rule 1.13 triggers an attorney's duties to report up when the law-
yer knows that a constituency of the organization-client engages in
illegal conduct "in a matter related to the representation. '" 98 By defini-
tion then, Rule 1.13 deals with representation-specific facts. Read to-
gether with Rule 1.4, the Rules' regulation of communications from
attorneys to clients during the life of the relationship deals almost ex-
clusively with representation-specific facts and generally does not re-
quire nor encourage the disclosure to clients of meta and set-up facts.
6. Rule 1.18 and Rules 7.1-7.6: Communications at the
Outset of the Attorney-Client Relationship
With regard to communications from clients to attorneys in the
pre-relationship phase, Rule 1.18 simply extends Rule 1.6's invitation
to prospective clients to "tell all" and share information with their pro-
spective attorneys by extending the confidentiality protection to the
discussions. 99
94. Id. at R. 1.15.
95. See id. at R. 1.5, 1.13, 1.15.
96. See id. at R. 1.16.
97. To an extent, exploring the communications content of these Rules along a time-
line mirrors the author's analysis because meta and set-up facts will often be communi-
cated at the pre-relationship stage, representation-specific facts during the life of the
relationship, and some set-up facts during the post-relationship phase. The typology of
representation-specific, meta, and set-up facts, however, does not completely parallel the
distinctions between pre-, ongoing, and post-relationship information. For example, while
a great deal of meta information is relevant to the pre-relationship stage (e.g., whether an
attorney carries malpractice liability coverage, passed the bar exam on the first try, or was
previously disciplined), meta information can apply to the ongoing relationship stage (e.g.,
whether an attorney falls out of coverage during the relationship or new disciplinary inves-
tigations are being pursued). In any event, the author's proposed typology demonstrates
that the Rules set in place an apparatus that limits communications from attorneys to
clients.
98. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b).
99. Id. at R. 1.18(b).
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The 7.1-7.6 cluster of Rules deals mostly with representation-spe-
cific facts, ignoring meta and set-up facts. For example, Rule 7.1, deal-
ing with communications concerning a lawyer's services, prohibits
false or misleading statements about the lawyer or the lawyer's ser-
vices. 100 The Comments clarify that Rule 7.1 covers all communica-
tions about the lawyer's services 0 and that even an otherwise truthful
statement will be deemed misleading "if it omits a fact necessary to
make the lawyer's communication considered as a whole not materi-
ally misleading."' 0 2 Interestingly, because Rule 7.1 covers all commu-
nications regarding the lawyer's services, it covers meta facts, and thus
the Comment opens the door to mandating disclosure of meta facts
that are necessary to avoid materially misleading a client. 10 3
If a lawyer chooses to communicate meta information to a client,
Rule 7.1 mandates that the communication be accurate. 10 4 For exam-
ple, if an attorney chooses to communicate information about her bar
examination, it must be accurate. An attorney cannot represent that
she passed the bar exam on the first attempt if she did not. Similarly,
if a lawyer decides to reveal information about the extent of her mal-
practice coverage, the statements must be accurate. But must a lawyer
disclose such meta facts to a prospective client? While the Comment
states that omitting a fact necessary to make a communication not mis-
leading constitutes a false statement, it stops short of affirmatively re-
quiring disclosure of relevant material meta facts.10 5 In other words, if
a lawyer decides to include a meta fact in her communications, then
she cannot omit misleading facts related to it. Rule 7.1, however, sim-
ply does not require the lawyer to reveal such facts, even if they may
be relevant to the client. 10 6
One can arguably read Rule 7.1 broadly to suggest that if a lawyer
represents that she is competent to represent a client and omits that
she failed the bar exam the first time she took it, or that she does not
carry malpractice coverage, she is violating, if not the letter of the
Rule, then its spirit. Omitting such meta facts materially misleads the
100. Id. at R. 7.1 ("A communication is false or misleading if it contains a material
misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the statement consid-
ered as a whole not materially misleading.").
101. Id. at cmt. 1.
102. Id. at cmt. 2.
103. Mignone, supra note 79, at 1111 ("[An] attorney 'shall not make a false or mis-
leading communication about the qualifications ... of any lawyer.. . .' Moreover, the rules
recognize that statements can be misleading if they omit relevant information.").
104. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.1.
105. Id. at cmt. 2.
106. Id. at R. 7.1.
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client regarding the lawyer's qualifications and competence. Rule
1.1107 on competence, however, does not support such a broad con-
struction. It defines competence more narrowly to include legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary
for the representation, °10 and does not extend to general qualifica-
tions. Once again, if an attorney decides to reveal meta facts she must
be truthful, but Rule 7.1 does not affirmatively require disclosure of
meta facts.
7. Rule 1.16: Communications After the Termination of
the Relationship
Finally, Rule 1.16, governing communications from attorneys to
clients during the unwinding of the relationship, generally addresses
representation-specific facts. For example, it mandates the attorney re-
turn the file to the client.109 The Rule also addresses some set-up facts,
requiring the lawyer to give her client reasonable notice of the termi-
nation of the representation.' 10 Overall, Rule 1.16's approach is con-
sistent with the general apparatus promulgated by the Rules:
mandating communication of some, but not all, representation-spe-
cific facts and mostly ignoring meta and set-up facts.
8. The Overall Approach of the Rules to Attorney-Client
Communications
The representation-specific, meta, and set-up typology of infor-
mation conclusively demonstrates that the Rules put in place a system
that perpetrates, facilitates, and supports the asymmetric distribution
of information within the attorney-client relationship. The communi-
cations rules encourage clients to "tell all" to their attorneys by ex-
tending the broad protection of confidentiality in Rules 1.6 and 1.18
to information flowing from clients to attorneys. The very same com-
munications rules, however, only mandate that lawyers communicate
to their clients a subset of representation-specific facts and generally
leave decisions regarding disclosure of meta and set-up facts to attor-
neys' professional discretion.
To be clear, far from constituting a mere academic insight, the
asymmetric characteristic of the communications regime orchestrated
by the Rules has important practical consequences. It belittles, even
107. Id. at R. 1.1.
108. Id.
109. Id. at R. 1.16(d).
110. Id.
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obscures, the need to communicate to clients important meta and set-
up facts. Should a lawyer communicate to a client that she is currently
suffering from drug or substance abuse, or marital difficulties that
could possibly affect the quality of the representation? Should she dis-
close to her client that there are pending malpractice lawsuits or disci-
plinary proceedings accusing her of wrongdoing, or that she settled
such proceedings in the past? Should an attorney reveal to her client
significant mistakes she has committed in representing her client even
if they did not result in significant harm to the client? Or disclose
mistakes that may give rise to a malpractice cause of action against
her? Should she explain to her client whether she carries malpractice
liability coverage and the consequences of the policy for the client or
alert the client if and when she falls out of coverage during the rela-
tionship? Should a lawyer give her client a "Miranda warning"-ex-
plaining that the recently revised Rules' new exceptions grant her the
discretion to reveal her client's confidential information, that is, that
anything the client confidentially reveals to her may be disclosed and
used against him later? Should a lawyer communicate to her client
whether she failed the bar exam on the first try or whether she was
granted special accommodations in law school for a learning disabil-
ity? Should she explain that her retainer agreement mandates arbitra-
tion in case a controversy develops regarding the relationship?
These important questions of meta and set-up facts are not regu-
lated by the Rules' one-way communications regime. Worse, by failing
to even address these facts, let alone require their disclosure in some
circumstances, the Rules seem to imply that these meta and set-up
facts need not be communicated to clients at all. Stated differently,
the communications regime implemented by the Rules obscures these
issues and thus decreases the probability of a meaningful discussion
about whether and under what circumstances such meta and set-up
facts ought to be communicated to clients.
H. Why Do the Rules Form an Asymmetric Informational
Exchange Between Attorneys and Clients?
The idea of an informed client-principal exercising authority over
decision-making in the relationship, as well as the practical impor-
tance of communications to the success of the representation, create
an expectation of meaningful communications between attorneys and
clients. The asymmetric communications regime orchestrated by the
Rules seems inconsistent with such an expectation and lays the bur-
den of justifying it on the legal profession. In other words, a commu-
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nications regime that contradicts the fundamental allocation of
authority in the relationship can only survive critical scrutiny if it can
be justified on the ground that it serves clients' interests or for other
compelling reasons."'
A. Justifiable Asymmetry
The information asymmetry brought about and reflected in the
Rules is arguably justified in terms of the overall purpose and nature
of the attorney-client relationship. A client who is not familiar with the
relevant law does not know what facts are relevant to his case. The
client is thus inherently poorly situated to draw the line between rele-
vant and irrelevant information.1 12 The Rules therefore encourage
and protect complete client disclosure of all "information relating to
the representation." 113 A lawyer, on the other hand, once provided
with facts about the matter, is entirely capable of assessing what law
applies and can thus make an informed decision about what legal
knowledge to explain to the client.11 4 The parties' asymmetric abilities
to assess the relevance of information arguably explain why the Rules
encourage the client to reveal all to his lawyer, but only guide the
lawyer to reveal some relevant information to her client.
111. Generally, according to the social bargain theory of professionalism, the public
and the profession strike a bargain in which the public grants the profession a monopoly
over the provision of services. The profession, in return, promulgates and enforces rules of
conduct that are meant to ensure the quality of professional services. See KennethJ. Arrow,
Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941 (1963); PARSONS,
supra note 31, at 35-37. Consequently, the profession has the burden to prove that specific
Rules in fact ensure the quality of legal services and serve the interests of clients. See Wald,
supra note 41, at 240-42.
112. Pursuant to the social bargain theory it is quite difficult for lay customers, even ex
post, to evaluate the quality of professional services they receive because such services are
the product of esoteric knowledge they usually do not possess. Wald, supra note 41, at 240.
113. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (a); see also supra notes 36-46 and accom-
panying text.
114. The assumption that lawyers master an esoteric body of knowledge-the law-
which allows them to exercise professional judgment to the benefit of clients is a funda-
mental aspect of professionalism. See Wasserstrom, supra note 20, at 1-4 (discussing the
essential characteristics of professionalism: esoteric knowledge, formal education, elevated
status, self-regulation, monopoly over the provision of professional services, role-morality,
and public service); see also THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS
(David Luban ed., 1984); MAGALI S. LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM (1977); ANDREW
ABBOTT, THE SYSTEMS OF PROFESSIONS (1988). The exercise of professional judgment, skill,
and practical wisdom is a key feature of esoteric knowledge. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE
LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 20-23 (1993) (exploring the no-
tion of lawyers' "practical wisdom" in detail and bemoaning its demise).
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In addition, communications serve different functions for the at-
torney and client. For the attorney, communication is a mere tool al-
lowing the lawyer to effectively perform her job and represent the
client's interests.' 1 5 For many clients, however, communication with
lawyers serves, in addition to this important yet narrow function, as a
vehicle of empowerment and vindication. 16 Telling one's story to a
sympathetic advocate is part of standing up for one's rights. 117 The
different functions of communication thus arguably help explain why
the Rules encourage a client to reveal all while justifying an attorney's
selective communications with the client.
Next, the Rules' limited approach to mandating communications
from lawyers to clients is possibly justified in terms of allowing lawyers
room to exercise professional judgment and discretion. The Rules
only set a floor of mandatory communications from attorney to client
with the understanding that lawyers will regularly exercise their discre-
tion and communicate freely with the clients above and beyond the
mandatory floor.118
Finally, asymmetric communications between attorney and client
seem both practical and efficient. Clients incur the cost of the rela-
tionship; specifically, the cost of both their own time and of lawyers'
time communicating. It is in the clients' best interests that lawyers be
economic and efficient in their communications. Indeed, some clients
simply do not want too much information and instead take the ap-
proach that the lawyer is the expert and should tell them what to
do.' 19 Moreover, whereas a client usually is facing one lawyer, an attor-
115. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDuCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2; see also supra note 27 and accom-
panying text.
116. See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1449, 1473-74 (2005) (arguing that the quality of attorney-client communi-
cations impacts a client's expressive empowerment or silencing).
117. See, e.g., Bernard P. Perlmutter, George's Story: Voice and Transformation Through the
Teaching and Practice of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in a Law School Advocacy Clinic, 17 ST.
THOMAS L. REv. 561, 595 (2005); Rebecca Smith, Human Rights at Home: Human Rights as
an Organizing and Legal Tool in Low-Wage Worker Communities, 3 STAN. J. Civ. RTS. & Ctv.
LIBERTIES 285, 313 (2007) (arguing that the ability to tell one's own story has an empower-
ing effect on the teller and a humanizing effect on the listener).
118. The Rules stress the role of discretion and the importance of the exercise of pro-
fessional judgment as constitutive features of effective lawyers. "In the nature of law prac-
tice . . . [v]irtually all difficult ethical problems.. , must be resolved through the exercise
of sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the basic principles underlying the
Rules." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preamble cmt. 9.
119. See, e.g., Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Four Discourses of Law: A Lacanian Analysis of
Legal Practice and Scholarship, 79 TEX. L. REv. 15, 68-69 (2000) (exploring the desire of
clients to have lawyers tell them not only what the law is but also what to do consistent with
their goals).
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ney has many clients. It is not practical for an attorney to communi-
cate all information to each and every client. For the client, the one
legal matter he is involved in might be very important. The relative
importance to the client explains why he might want and need to dis-
cuss the issue in great detail. For the lawyer, each matter is but one of
many pending cases and the relative lack of importance of each mat-
ter justifies prudence in communicating about it.
Different abilities, different functions, and other practical consid-
erations thus justify some features of the asymmetric distribution of
information in the attorney-client relationship and the communica-
tions apparatus of the Rules. For example, these considerations per-
suasively account for the reasonableness requirements in Rule 1.4,120
and for the Rules' divergent approach to communicating personal
meta information between the parties. The Rules encourage clients to
reveal personal meta information to their attorneys but fail to provide
similar incentives to attorneys to reveal personal meta information to
clients, unless the personal information relates to the ability of the
lawyer to effectively represent the client. In that case, Rules 1.4(a) (2),
1.4(a) (3), and 1.16 might require disclosure.121
While these considerations support asymmetric communications
rules conceptually, they fail to justify some of the particular choices
made by the Rules. The justifications clearly support the proposition
that clients should communicate more to lawyers than attorneys
should communicate to clients, but they do not help in drawing the
specific lines of communications manifested in the Rules. Specifically,
the Rules' consistent failure to regulate the communication of meta
and set-up facts to clients is not well supported by these propositions.
For example, it is not self-explanatory why the Rules do not require
lawyers to disclose to clients information regarding their qualifications
and other meta facts, such as how the lawyer plans to exercise her
discretion regarding exceptions to confidentiality, or whether the law-
yer carries malpractice liability coverage. Some of these meta facts
might be important to the client in making an informed decision
120. Rule 1.4 limits the scope of mandated communications from attorney to client by
requiring only "reasonable" communications four different times, in subsections 1.4(a) (2),
(a) (3), (a)(4), and (b). MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4.
121. Rule 1.16(a) (2) states that an attorney must withdraw from representing a client if
"the lawyer's physical or mental condition materially impairs the lawyer's ability to rep-
resent the client." Id, at R. 1.16(a) (2). Presumably, circumstances in the attorney's per-
sonal life might cause her to withdraw, in which case Rules 1.16(d), 1.4(a)(2), and
1.4(a) (3) require prompt notice to and communications with the client. Id. at R. 1.4(a) (2),
1.4(a)(3), 1.16(a)(2), 1.16(d).
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about whether to retain the attorney and how to effectively pursue the
goals of the relationship. However, as we have seen, the Rules gener-
ally fail to require disclosure of meta facts to clients.
Similarly, the asymmetry in the regulation of set-up information is
puzzling. While the Rules encourage clients to reveal all to their law-
yers, 122 they fail to require that attorneys provide clients with a written
notice of the fee agreement or to require that lawyers communicate to
their clients their own malpractice. 123
B. Paternalism
"That the practice of law is rife with paternalism should come as
no surprise to anyone."' 24 Based on an elevated professional and so-
cial status, lawyers have traditionally exercised significant control over
their clients' decision-making processes. 125 Richard Wasserstrom ar-
gues that such domination naturally fosters paternalism. 126 Arguably
then, paternalism helps explain the one-way communications regime
orchestrated by the Rules.
A paternalistic approach to attorney-client communications does
not necessarily amount to usurping the client's role as the ultimate
decision-maker within the relationship. Instead, it justifies an asym-
metric communication apparatus1 27 by suggesting that clients are not
122. The Rules, however, do carve out an exception to confidentiality which allows
lawyers to reveal client confidential information in some circumstances involving fee dis-
putes. Id. at R. 1.6(b)(5) cmt. 11.
123. Rule 1.5(b) states in relevant part that "The scope of the representation and the
basis or rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will be responsible shall be com-
municated to the client, preferably in writing. . . ." Id. at R. 1.5(b) (emphasis added). Only
NewJersey and New York require that attorneys communicate with clients about their own
malpractice. See Nancy J. Moore, Implications of Circle Chevrolet for Attorney Malpractice and
Attorney Ethics, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 57, 70-78 (1996) on the duty of an attorney to advise a
client that he might have a malpractice claim against that attorney.
124. David Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 454, 460
(1981).
125. See Kilborn, supra note 10, at 6 (offering a summary of lawyers' exercise of power
over clients through the ages).
126. Wasserstrom, supra note 20, at 19. Criticisms of the legal profession's paternalistic
approach to clients led, beginning in the mid 1960s, to the emergence of a new client-
centered approach. Client-centered lawyering allocates clients, rather than attorneys, pri-
mary authority over decision-making within the relationship. See Maute, supra note 12, at
1053-60; Spiegel, The New Model Rules, supra note 12, at 1003; Strauss, supra note 12, at
336-39; see also DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A
CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1977); MURRAY T. BLOOM, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS
(1968).
127. Luban defines a paternalistic structure as "a social arrangement that makes it es-
pecially likely that paternalistic actions will be performed whether or not they are justified."
Luban, supra note 124, at 460.
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well positioned to evaluate certain types of information, are likely to
misconstrue certain facts, and therefore act in ways that are inconsis-
tent with their own best interests.1 28 For example, a paternalistic ap-
proach might suggest that lawyers need not share with clients whether
they passed the bar exam on the first attempt or whether they carry
malpractice coverage because clients are likely to exaggerate the im-
portance of these objectively insignificant facts and consequently
make decisions contradictory to their own interests.
Following David Luban's paradigm, one might argue that a law-
yer might override a client's "want" for additional information regard-
ing the attorney in the name of promoting the client's interests in
effective representation. 129 The lawyer may take this position on the
ground that additional information regarding, for example, meta
facts about the lawyer is irrelevant given the client's interests. Provid-
ing additional information nonetheless is likely to cause the client to
terminate the relationship or otherwise act in ways inconsistent with
the client's interests.130 The lawyer imputes to the client the end of
choosing a qualified and effective attorney and ignores the client's
desire for more information that is inconsistent with the pursuit of the
imputed goal.
Luban's analysis, however, does not support a paternalistic ap-
proach to attorney-client communications. Paternalism, according to
Luban, may be justified when one knows and understands the values
and interests of another 131 and overrides them when one reasonably
believes that the other is about to act impulsively and violate his own
interests. 132 An application of the argument in the context of attor-
ney-client communications suggests that an attorney may override her
client's desire to have more information if the lawyer knows and un-
derstands the client's goals. This element of paternalistic conduct is
presumably satisfied by Rule 1.6, which encourages clients to "share
128. See Wald, supra note 41, at 240.
129. Luban, supra note 124, at 473-74.
130. The Rules are no stranger to instances where disclosure of information to clients
is postponed on the ground that it may cause the client to act in imprudent ways. MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 cmt. 7 (2007) (allowing a lawyer to delay sharing informa-
tion with the client when the client would be likely to react imprudently to an immediate
communication).
131. Luban, supra note 124, at 473.
132. Id. It should be noted that the Model Rules take a much harsher approach regard-
ing lawyers' paternalism. Rule 1.2, vesting the ultimate decision-making authority in the
client, essentially rejects all instances of paternalism, with the exception of Rule 1.14,
which allows a lawyer to act in the client's best interests only when the client suffers from
diminished capacity. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2, 1.14.
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all" and thus places lawyers in a position to know and understand cli-
ents' values, interests, and wants.' 33
Luban's analysis, however, also requires that the client will act im-
pulsively and violate his own interests as a condition for paternalistic
intervention. There is simply no reason to paternalistically and system-
atically fail to share meta and set-up facts with clients. Even if there is a
risk that clients may misunderstand meta and set-up facts and will pro-
ceed to act impulsively, lawyers can address the concern by effectively
explaining the information, per Rule 1.4(b), or explaining why the
information is irrelevant given the decision facing the client.134
C. Guild Advantage
The Rules are drafted by and serve at least in part, the interests
of, the legal profession. 135 A "tell all" communications policy gov-
erning client-to-lawyer communications protected by confidentiality
gives lawyers a competitive advantage over other professionals and ser-
vice providers who cannot offer such a protection to their clients. 136 A
corresponding communication duty from lawyers to clients would be
ineffective and costly for lawyers. Thus, a cynical critique would sug-
gest that the one-way communications regime adopted by the Rules
promotes the interests of lawyers in having a comparative advantage
over other service providers, without imposing on them the added
cost of more demanding communications with clients.
This cynical explanation is similar to the paternalistic account in
that lawyers limit their communications with clients. The cynical view,
however, lacks the ideological conviction of paternalism. It does not
133. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6.
134. Even in instances in which paternalism can justify asymmetric distribution of in-
formation in the relationship, it does suffer from three significant flaws. First, neither the
profession nor clients have asserted or accepted the paternalism justification in the context
of attorney-client communications. Second, paternalism resulting in withholding from cli-
ents meta and set-up facts about the qualifications of the attorney raises serious concerns
about the attorney's competence and the legitimacy of her role. Finally, such paternalism
flies in the face of the principle of non-accountability. Indeed, if lawyers were to openly
engage in paternalistic decision-making on behalf of their clients, they should be legally
liable and morally accountable for the objectives and consequences of the relationship. See
supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
135. See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAw'aRs 142-57 (1989) for critical analysis of the
Rules as means of pursuing the interests of the legal profession. See generally ABBOTr, supra
note 114; LARSON, supra note 114. But see Eli Wald, An Unlikely Knight in Economic Armor:
"Law and Economics" in Defense of Professional Ideals, 31 SETON HALL L. REv. 1042 (2001)
(offering a utilitarian defense of professional ideology and the Rules).
136. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 185-211
(1999); Fischel, supra note 45, at 4.
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assume that lawyers are better at making decisions for their clients
than the clients themselves, and therefore need not communicate
with clients; nor does it suggest that lawyers are trying to act in the
best interests of clients. Instead, it simply admits that it is inefficient
and contrary to lawyers' interests to comprehensively communicate
with their clients in detail regarding meta and set-up facts, and implies
that the communications regime orchestrated by the Rules reflects the
interests of the legal profession.
Comment [12] to the Preamble states: "The profession has a re-
sponsibility to assure that its regulations are conceived in the public
interest and not in furtherance of parochial or self-interested con-
cerns of the bar."13 7 Thus, the justification for the communications
regime implemented by the Rules must be grounded in the public
interest. The public interest, defined in Comment [1], consists of the
interests of clients, the legal system, and society in the quality of jus-
tice.13 8 Indeed, the Rules are explicitly a part of the public protection
scheme: "The Rules of Professional Conduct are intended not only to
establish ethical standards for members of the bar, but are also de-
signed to protect the public."139
While a one-way communications apparatus limiting the commu-
nication duties of lawyers to their clients may serve the interest of law-
yers and the legal profession, it fails as a justification. A justification
consistent with Comment [12], the ideal of clients as principals, and
the principle of effective attorney-client communications must be
grounded in the best interests of clients. To the extent that the Rules'
communications regime is not explained in terms of the public inter-
est or the interests of clients, but rather by the interests of lawyers and
the legal profession, the explanation may be revealing but it fails to
sufficiently justify the Rules.
137. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preamble cmt. 12.
138. Id. at cmt. 1.
139. Ames v. State Bar of Cal., 506 P.2d 625, 629 (Cal. 1973) (internal citations omit-
ted). Failure to self-regulate accordingly may lead to increased legal malpractice actions,
judicially imposed sanctions, and government regulation of the profession. See Manuel R.
Ramos, Legal Malpractice: The Profession's Dirty Little Secret, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1657, 1686
(1994).
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III. Leveling the Communications Playing Field
A. Agency Relationship, the Ideology of Client Autonomy, and
Lawyer Non-Accountability
Rule 1.4 consistently and repeatedly mandates communication to
ensure informed client participation in the representation. Comment
[1] to Rule 1.4 explicitly states: "Reasonable communication between
the lawyer and the client is necessary for the client effectively to par-
ticipate in the representation.' 140 Comment [5] states: "The client
should have sufficient information to participate intelligently in deci-
sions concerning the objectives of the representation and the means
by which they are to be pursued .... ,,141 By emphasizing client partici-
pation in the relationship, Rule 1.4 implements the agency ideal of a
client-principal and justifies the lawyer's non-accountability principle
that follows.' 4 2
A true commitment to the attorney-client relationship as an
agency relationship in which a lawyer-agent serves a client-principal is
inconsistent with an asymmetric communications regime. Living up to
the agency ideal of installing clients as principals within the relation-
ship and allowing lawyers to escape moral accountability for the ser-
vices they render as agents requires that lawyers and the legal
profession take attorney-client communications seriously and man-
date disclosure of meta and set-up facts to clients. Indeed, the princi-
ple of non-accountability makes sense only to the extent that it is true
that clients alone control the objectives of the relationship and co-
control the means. Clients, however, do not control the objectives of
the relationship and therefore cannot be responsible for the goals of
the relationship, unless they are informed about, fully participate in,
dominate, and control the relationship. In other words, in order to
legitimately sustain its commitment to the principle of lawyer non-ac-
countability the Rules must adopt a more demanding communica-
tions regime. In such a regime, lawyers would provide clients with
more information-meta and set-up facts-and consequently treat cli-
ents as the true principals of the attorney-client relationship. 14
3
140. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 cmt. 1.
141. Id. at cmt. 5.
142. See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text.
143. One should note that even in an alternative model of the attorney-client relation-
ship abandoning the non-accountability principle-one in which the lawyer would be lia-
ble and accountable alongside her client for the objectives and consequences of the
relationship-communications still should be taken seriously. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. SIMON,
THE PRACTICE OFJUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERs' ETHICS (1988); William H. Simon, Ethical
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B. In Search of a New Communications Rule: Jane Austen,
Attorney's Civil Liability, and the Duty of "Absolute and
Perfect Candor"
One way to correct for the asymmetric informational exchange
between attorneys and clients is to adopt an "absolute and complete"
communications rule that would mirror the tell all approach of Rule
1.6, guaranteeing a free flow of information from lawyers to clients. 144
Jane Austen's quote from Emma,145 however, serves as a cautionary
tale against such a broad communications rule, reminding us that
such an "absolute and complete" communication is conceptually not
feasible. No human is capable of complete disclosure, and holding
lawyers to such a standard would be both impractical and imprudent.
Vincent Johnson's excellent critical study of the fiduciary duty of
"absolute and perfect candor"' 46 further discredits the "absolute and
complete" communications rule. 147 Johnson finds that "[t]here is lit-
tle, if anything, in case law to suggest that, in a case not governed by a
specific rule mandating disclosure, non-negligent failure to furnish in-
formation to a client will give rise to civil liability. ' 148 The communica-
tions obligations of attorneys to clients can be described instead by the
rule of negligence: an attorney must act reasonably in providing infor-
mation to her client.149 Johnson concludes that the more demanding
Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1083 (1998) (outlining a theory of ethical discre-
tion in lawyer decision-making). If clients are to be held liable and accountable for the
objectives and consequences of the relationship, and if clients' autonomy is to be taken
seriously, they must have authority over the relationship. Authority requires informed par-
ticipation which in turn requires effective communications from attorney to client.
144. Such an "absolute and complete" communications rule might read:
Rule 1.4: Absolute and Complete Communications
A Lawyer shall:
(a) promptly inform the client of any information relating to the representation.
(b) explain information to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to
make informed decisions regarding the representation.
145. JANE AUSTEN, EMMA 392 (Oxford University Press ed. 2003) (1815).
146. Vincent R. Johnson, "Absolute and Perfect Candor" to Clients, 34 ST. MARY'S L.J. 737
(2003).
147. To be sure, Johnson studied lawyers' fiduciary obligations as a basis for civil liabil-
ity as opposed to disciplinary rules of professional conduct. Id at 742-44. On the relation-
ship between civil liability and rules of professional conduct, see MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT Preamble cmt. 20 (2007). Johnson's analysis is nonetheless instructive in demon-
strating the shortcomings of an overly broad communications duty.
148. Johnson, supra note 146, at 775-76.
149. Id. at 775. Johnson points out that a negligence-based communications rule will
be consistent with the Restatement, which states that "[a] lawyer who has acted with rea-
sonable care is not liable in damages for breach of fiduciary duty." See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAw GOVERNING LAwYERS § 49 cmt. d (2000) (noting that remedies such as
disqualification, restitution, and injunctive relief may be available).
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strict liability type of approach, setting "absolute and perfect candor"
as the standard of communications, should be limited to circum-
stances where there is a conflict of interest between the attorney and
her client, such as in the context of lawyer-client business
transactions. 150
An "absolute and complete" duty would not constitute a desirable
alternative to the Rules' one-way communications regime. As we have
seen, the Rules already require that lawyers communicate to clients
most representation-specific information. 51 Mandating communica-
tion of all representation-specific, meta, and set-up information would
be both impractical and inefficient. a52 Doing so would provide clients
with too much information of little utility to them, and deny lawyers
the ability to exercise professional discretion over the relationship-
the very same ability for which clients often retain attorneys to begin
with. 153
C. Materiality as the Appropriate Standard for Attorney-Client
Communications
Because the attorney-client relationship is an agency relationship,
the Rules of Professional Conduct derive from the law of agency. 1 54
The Restatement (Second) of Agency § 381155 details the duty of an
agent to give information to his principal:
Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to use reason-
able efforts to give his principal information which is relevant to
affairs entrusted to him and which, as the agent has notice, the
principal would desire to have and which can be communicated
without violating a superior duty to a third person. 156
The Restatement thus requires that the agent communicate any
information to the principal that the principal would desire to have,
150. Johnson, supra note 146, at 775-76.
151. See supra Part I.C.
152. See supra Part II.A.
153. SeeJohnson, supra note 146, at 739. As Johnson persuasively argues,
If lawyers were required to be mere relayers of information and not permitted to
exercise judgment in terms of what facts to convey to clients, the legal system
would run far less smoothly than it does today. It has been impressively urged that
the essence of good lawyering is the exercise of judgment.
Id.
154. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAw GovERNING LAwYERS Ch. 2, Introductory Note
("The subject matter of this Chapter [entitled 'The Client-Lawyer Relationship'] is, from
one point of view, derived from the law of agency.").
155. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 381 (1958).
156. Id.
Winter 2008] ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
even if "not specifically instructed to do so."' 1 5 7 Courts have not only
recognized attorneys as agents of principal-clients, but in fact have
held that more is required of an attorney-an utmost duty to disclose
information the client would consider important15 8-thus lending
support to a materiality-based standard of communications.
A materiality standard strikes an appropriate balance by ensuring
that clients receive all important and relevant information a prudent
and reasonable client would want to have before making decisions re-
garding the objectives of the representation. Just as "l[t] he 'material-
ity' threshold therefore 'plays a critical gatekeeper['s] role' by
separating the essential information from the 'less important that
would be extraneous or irrelevant to investors,"' 159 so can a material-
ity-based communications rule play a critical gatekeeper role guaran-
teeing that clients receive essential information necessary for their
informed participation in the relationship.
1. Materiality Defined
The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines a fact as material
based on whether a reasonable person would attach importance to the
fact misrepresented or omitted in determining his or her course of
157. Id. at cmt. a.
158. See, e.g., Daugherty v. Runner, 581 S.W.2d 12, 16 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
159. Yvonne Ching Ling Lee, The Elusive Concept of "Materiality" Under U.S. Federal Securi-
ties Laws, 40 WILLAMETrE L. REv. 661, 662 (2004) (internal citations omitted). Lee argues
that the federal securities laws' standard of materiality, centered upon the "mythical rea-
sonable investor," should be revised to reflect the information's impact on market prices.
Id. at 677-78. While the application of materiality in the securities context is outside the
scope of this Article, note that some have argued that the concept of materiality is not
elusive. Rather, "[t]he rule is clear; it is its application which is so difficult." See Homer
Kripke, Rule lOb-5 Liability and "Material Facts", 46 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1061, 1069 (1971) (argu-
ing that the Court intended to devise an ad-hoc, fact-specific materiality standard).
Lee's provocative thesis has interesting implications for the study of materiality in the
context of an attorney-client relationship. Her argument suggests that the standard for
materiality should not be based on the "reasonable client" but instead be a function of the
impact of the information in question. Lee's insight, however, is not easily applicable in
the attorney-client context. Unlike the market for securities, the notion of the market for
legal services is not as intuitive. Specifically, whereas one might plausibly quantify the ef-
fects of information in the market for securities based on its impact on the price of securi-
ties, one cannot quantify communications from attorney to client based on the "price" of
legal services because fees are not generally determined by market considerations of supply
and demand. See Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the
Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REv. 953 (2000). Consequently, the author of this Article will
explore the traditional materiality standard of the "mythical reasonable investor" and apply
it to mean the "reasonable client."
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action. 160 Materiality has been extensively explored in cases involving
sections of the securities laws. Although the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934161 fails to expressly define materiality, the Supreme Court con-
strued materiality in the seminal case of TSC Industries, Inc. v.
Northway,162 and then expressly adopted the TSC Industries materiality
standard in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson.163 In TSC Industries, the Court ex-
plained the general standard of materiality:
An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding
how to vote .... It does not require proof of a substantial likeli-
hood that disclosure of the omitted fact would have caused the
reasonable investor to change his vote. What the standard does
contemplate is a showing of a substantial likelihood that, under all
the circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual sig-
nificance in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder. Put
another way, there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclo-
sure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the "total mix" of informa-
tion made available.1 64
This materiality standard is particularly suited to governing com-
munications in the attorney-client relationship. The client is the ulti-
mate decision-maker in the relationship and is alone responsible for
its objectives, akin to the position of a shareholder who is alone re-
sponsible for his investment decision. A lawyer must therefore reveal
all information that a reasonable client would attach importance to in
determining the objectives of the representation. Again, this is analo-
gous to the duties of corporate insiders who must reveal to sharehold-
ers all material information regarding the investment decision. In
other words, a fact is material for purposes of attorney-client commu-
nications if it would significantly alter the "total mix" of information a
160. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538(2) (a) (1977); see also Am. Law Inst.,
Federal Securities Code § 256 (a) (1973).
161. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-111 (2000)).
162. 426 U.S. 438 (1976). A TSC shareholder claimed that a proxy statement filed
jointly by TSC and National, one of its shareholders and its acquirer, was incomplete and
materially misleading in violation of the Securities Exchange Act because it failed to dis-
close facts relating to the degree of National's control over TSC and the favorability of the
terms of the proposal to TSC shareholders. Id. at 440-43. The Court reversed the grant of
partial summaryjudgment for the shareholder and remanded for further proceedings con-
sistent with its construction of materiality. Id. at 463-64.
163. 485 U.S. 224, 232, 249 (1988).
164. TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449. "The question of materiality, it is universally agreed, is
an objective one, involving the significance of an omitted or misrepresented fact to a rea-
sonable investor." Id. at 445.
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reasonable client would want to know prior to making an informed
decision regarding the relationship.
The Court rejected a broader alternative formulation adopted by
the court of appeals, which defined a fact to be material if a share-
holder might consider it important. The Court found that "the
'might' formulation is 'too suggestive of mere possibility, however un-
likely,'"1 6 5 reasoning that in formulating a standard of materiality, the
purpose is "to ensure disclosures by corporate management in order
to enable the shareholders to make an informed choice.' 66 The
Court stated:
Some information is of such dubious significance that insistence
on its disclosure may accomplish more harm than good. The po-
tential liability for a Rule 14a-9 violation can be great indeed, and if
the standard of materiality is unnecessarily low, not only may the
corporation and its management be subjected to liability for insig-
nificant omissions or misstatements, but also management's fear of
exposing itself to substantial liability may cause it simply to bury the
shareholders in an avalanche of trivial information-a result that is
hardly conducive to informed decision-making.
16 7
Similarly, a fact should not be deemed material simply because a
client might consider it important. Such a broad definition of materi-
ality may cause attorneys to simply bury clients in an avalanche of triv-
ial information-a result that is hardly conducive to informed
decision-making.
2. Materiality in the Attorney-Client Relationship
The Court's analysis in TSC Industries is highly relevant to the con-
struction of materiality in the context of an attorney-client relation-
ship. Similar to the securities context, the purpose of communications
between attorneys and clients is to ensure disclosure by attorneys to
enable clients to make informed decisions about the relationship.
And yet, "[t] he issue of materiality may be characterized as a mixed
question of law and fact... ."168 The law governing the attorney-client
relationship is different from that of securities law, in that the poten-
tial liability and discipline for professional negligence tends to be,
practically speaking, relatively low when compared with liability under
165. Id. at 449 (citing Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1302 (2d Cir.
1973) (Friendly, J.)).
166. Id. at 448.
167. Id. at 448-49.
168. See TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 450.
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the securities statutes. 169 This suggests a lower threshold for disclosure
in the legal context because lawyers will otherwise not over-disclose
for fear of liability.
On the other hand, like managers, lawyers are hired by clients for
their professional expertise and exercise of professional judgment.170
Clients do not want to know all trivial information relating to the rep-
resentation, only important information. 171 Some information relat-
ing to the relationship can be of such dubious significance that
insistence on its disclosure may accomplish more harm than good.
The Court further clarified that "[t]he determination requires
delicate assessments of the inferences a 'reasonable shareholder'
would draw from a given set of facts and the significance of those in-
ferences to him, and these assessments are peculiarly ones for the trier
of fact." 172 The determination of whether a particular fact is material
is context-specific and depends on the nature of the relationship and
the circumstances of the investor.
The application of the materiality standard is, by definition, con-
text- and fact-specific and might be a daunting task. The Court in Ba-
sic acknowledged as much when it was called upon to apply its
materiality standard to preliminary merger discussion.1 73 The Court
explained that where "the event is contingent or speculative in nature,
it is difficult to ascertain whether the 'reasonable investor' would have
considered the omitted information significant at the time. Merger
negotiations, because of the ever-present possibility that the contem-
169. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lauryers, supra note 21, at 503 ("The rules of professional
conduct are chronically underenforced."); Mary C. Daly, The Dichotomy Between Standards
and Rules: A New Way of Understanding the Differences in Perceptions of Lawyer Codes of Conduct by
U.S. and Foreign Lawyers, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1117, 1127 (1999) ("Lawyer discipline
in the United States has always been an embarrassment."); Marshall J. Breger, Should an
Attorney be Required to Advise a Client of ADR Options? 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 427, 453
(2000) ("In practice, civility codes can cause confusion among the judiciary and the prac-
ticing bar, because it is not always clear when mandatory rules of professional conduct, as
opposed to 'aspirational' statements of ideal conduct, are being applied.").
170. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
172. See 7SC Indus., 426 U.S. at 450. The Court, however, also acknowledged that sum-
mary judgment may be appropriate when "the established omissions are 'so obviously im-
portant to an investor, that reasonable minds cannot differ on the question of
materiality.'" Id. (quotingJohns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124, 1129 (4th Cir.
1970)).
173. "The application of this materiality standard ... is not self-evident." Basic, Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988).
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plated transaction will not be effectuated, fall into the latter
category.1 174
The Court's analysis is highly instructive regarding the applica-
tion of materiality in the context of attorney-client communications.
With regard to some information, namely representation-specific
facts, the application of the materiality standards will be straightfor-
ward. One example of this is where the lawyer receives a settlement
offer or a plea-bargain offer. Clearly a reasonable client would want to
be informed of the offer so he can decide on an informed basis
whether to accept or reject it.175 Sometimes, however, the nature of
the information will render the materiality determination difficult.
The information might be contingent in nature or might be inher-
ently ambiguous, as in malpractice insurance coverage. Unique attor-
ney-client contexts might call for particular applications of materiality,
exactly as unique securities situations led the Court to articulate a spe-
cifically-tailored account of materiality for preliminary merger discus-
sions. Therefore, adopting a materiality-based communications
standard does not automatically mean that lawyers would have to com-
municate to their clients all meta and set-up facts. 176 Adoption of such
a standard, however, would entail fact-specific determinations regard-
ing meta and set-up facts, exactly the kind of regulation missing from
the asymmetric communications regime of the Rules which systemati-
cally ignores all such facts.
The Court's analysis in Basic nevertheless provides important gui-
dance as to how to construe materiality in unique contexts. In re-
jecting the Third Circuit's "agreement-in-principle" test for
materiality, 177 the Court expressly rejected its three rationales: (1)
that a low threshold might cause management to overwhelm investors
with excessive detail and trivial information; (2) that management
must be allowed to do its job, i.e., to explore the possibility of a
merger; and (3) that the test provides a bright-line rule for determin-
ing materiality.1 78 The Court explained that the underlying considera-
tion in assessing materiality is the significance of the information.
174. Id.
175. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmts. 1-2 (2007) (describing the
allocation of authority between attorney and client).
176. See supra Part I.C.8 for a description of which facts fall within the categories of
meta and set-up facts, respectively.
177. According to which, "preliminary merger discussions do not become material un-
til 'agreement-in-principle' as to the price and structure of the transaction has been
reached between the would-be merger partners." Basic, 485 U.S. at 233.
178. Id. at 233-34.
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While acknowledging the importance of not overwhelming investors
with an abundance of trivial information, the Court cautioned against
a "paternalistic withholding of accurate information" that attributes to
investors "a child-like simplicity."' 79 The Court also acknowledged that
the timing of communication might be a relevant factor in determin-
ing materiality.
Thus, applying the Court's insight in the context of the attorney-
client relationship suggests that Rule 1.4's paternalistic exclusion of
all meta and set-up facts °8 0 must be rejected as attributing to clients a
"child-like simplicity." 18 1 Furthermore, the issue of when a lawyer com-
municates information is an altogether different question than
whether the information is material and must be communicated.1
82
Finally, the Court explained why materiality defies a bright-line rule:
"Any approach that designates a single fact or occurrence as always
determinative of an inherently fact-specific finding such as materiality,
must necessarily be over inclusive or under inclusive." 1 83 The same
rationale explains why no bright-line rule may define materiality in
the context of attorney-client communications.
The Court addressed how materiality applies to information or
events that are contingent or speculative in nature: "Under such cir-
cumstances, materiality 'will depend at any given time upon a balanc-
ing of both the indicated probability that the event will occur and the
anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the com-
pany activity.'"" 8 4 When contingent or speculative disclosure is at is-
sue, the analysis is fact-specific. 185 Furthermore, the Court explained
Generally, in order to assess the probability that the event will oc-
cur, a factfinder will need to look to indicia of interest .... [B]y
way of example . . . board resolutions, instructions to investment
bankers, and actual negotiations between principals .. . may serve
as indicia of interest. To assess the magnitude of the transaction to
the issuer . . . a factfinder will need to consider such facts as the
size of the two corporate entities and of the potential premiums
over market values. No particular event or factor.., need be either
necessary or sufficient by itself .... 186
179. Id. at 234.
180. See supra notes 124-34 and accompanying text.
181. Basic, 485 U.S. at 234.
182. Id. at 234-35.
183. Id. at 236.
184. Id. at 238 (quoting SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968)
(en banc)).
185. See id. at 239-40.
186. Id. at 239.
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By analogy, different types of attorney-client relationships will call
for different applications of the materiality standard in assessing the
required scope of communications between attorneys and clients. 187
3. Materiality-The Next Generation
Borrowing the concept of materiality from the securities arena
has the added benefit of a rich body of case law and scholarly work
applying and assessing it. Margaret Sachs argues that in inefficient
markets, "the least sophisticated investor" should be the lower thresh-
old for materiality, replacing "the reasonable investor."188 In ex-
change for lowering the required level of materiality, the required
level of scienter should be raised. 189 Sachs asserts that the "reasonable
investor" standard "has an Achilles' heel-its inability to address the
fraud that deceives certain unsophisticated investors." 190 Recent social
developments-namely increased Internet fraud, increased
telemarketing fraud, growing financial illiteracy, increased elderly in-
vestment, and increased immigrant investment 191-expose the inabil-
ity of the "reasonable investor" standard to protect this vulnerable and
"unreasonable" underclass of investors.
187. Further insight can be gained from the Court's analysis of the "puffery" and "be-
speak" doctrines in securities law. With regard to puffery:
In particular, "projections and statements of optimism may trigger liability under
federal securities laws." But such statements may also fall under the protection of
the so-called puffery defense or puffery doctrine. Under the puffery defense,
statements that are too vague, promotional, or hyperbolic, constitute mere puff-
ery and are therefore immaterial as a matter of law.
Peter H. Huang, Moody Investing and the Supreme Court: Rethinking the Materiality of Informa-
tion and the Reasonableness ofInvestors, 13 Sup. CT. ECoN. REv. 99, 113 (2005). Moreover,
[t] he judicially created "bespeaks caution" doctrine protects optimistic forward-
looking statements including forecasts, projections, and opinions from allega-
tions of misrepresentation and omission when those statements are accompanied
by meaningful cautionary language. Under the "bespeaks caution" doctrine, for-
ward-looking statements accompanied by meaningful cautionary language are
deemed to be immaterial. Courts have utilized the "bespeaks caution" doctrine to
rule on the pleadings as a matter of law, usually by granting a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim or a motion for summary judgment.
Id. at 122; see also Allan Horwich, The Neglected Relationship of Materiality and Recklessness in
Actions Under Rule lOb-5, 55 Bus. LAw. 1023, 1031-32 (2000). Applied to the attorney-client
communications context, the puffery and bespeak doctrines suggest that lawyers need not
communicate to clients vague and optimistic forward-looking statements.
188. Margaret V. Sachs, Materiality and Social Change: The Case for Replacing "The Reasona-
ble Investor" with "The Least Sophisticated Investor" in Inefficient Markets, 81 TUL. L. REv. 473,
481 (2006).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 476.
191. Id. at 492-95.
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In the context of the attorney-client relationship, however, the
"reasonable client" standard is appropriate and should not be re-
placed by a "least-sophisticated client" standard. 19 2 The need for the
adoption of the least-sophisticated investor standard arises from social
developments that created an underclass of investors: "those trading
in inefficient markets without an adviser," 19 3 online and over-the-
phone investors, as well as the elderly and immigrant investors. No
such comparable underclass of clients exists warranting the adoption
of the least sophisticated client standard. Indeed, the attorney-client
relationship is inherently personal, a relationship not between stran-
gers but between fiduciaries. While e-mail and telephone exchanges
are common, no attorney-client relationship is limited to them. Fur-
thermore, the Rules already impose a special duty on lawyers who re-
present clients with diminished capacity.1 94 To the extent client
underclasses exist, such as the elderly and minors,1 95 they are afforded
protection within the Rules and are not in need of a special communi-
cations standard akin to the least sophisticated client.
Peter Huang also challenges the reliance of materiality on the
notion of the reasonable investor, arguing that in light of evidence
suggesting the prevalence of "moody investing"-investing based not
on reasonableness but rather on emotion' 96-the definition of mate-
riality should be revised. Huang argues that the materiality standard
should be grounded not in a normative idealized type of "reasonable"
192. Id. at 503-04. "This fictional person is drawn from deception cases decided under
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). Enacted in 1977, the FDCPA protects
consumers from deception and other unscrupulous debt collection practices." Id. at 503.
Sachs further explains that courts have defined "the least sophisticated consumer," the
threshold for triggering the EDCPA, as
someone of "below average ... intelligence" who lacks "even the sophistication of
the average, everyday, common consumer.... ." This individual is not totally lack-
ing in cognitive capacity. He can, for example, be expected to know that an enve-
lope marked "priority" is not necessarily of true urgency. Moreover, he should be
aware of information appearing on the back of a letter, at least where he is specifi-
cally instructed to turn the page. On the other hand, he may assume that an
attorney's signature on a letter means that the attorney has personal familiarity
with the facts of his case. He may infer from the phrase "once judgment is ob-
tained" that a judgment against him cannot be avoided.
Id. at 503-04 (internal citations omitted).
193. Id. at 476.
194. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 (2007).
195. Id. at cmt. 1 (identifying minors, the elderly, and those who suffer from dimin-
ished mental capacity as possibly falling within the definition of "clients with diminished
capacity").
196. Huang, supra note 187.
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behavior but instead on a descriptive realistic depiction of actual be-
havior.' 9 7 Thus,
Moody investing suggests a new definition for the materiality of in-
formation which focuses on the magnitude of the risky outcomes
and on the degree or vividness of mental imagery. Such a reformu-
lation of materiality suggests that an emotionally rich presentation
of information can be material while a less emotionally vivid pres-
entation of the same cognitive information can be immaterial. In
other words, determinations of materiality would and should de-
pend not just on the cognitive form and content of information,
but also upon the affective form or presentation and emotional
content of that information. 19 8
Huang's definition of materiality makes sense in the context of
the attorney-client relationship because clients heavily rely on lawyers'
presentation of information. The materiality of an attorney's commu-
nication should depend not only on the content of what the lawyer
says, but also on how the lawyer presents it.199 Unlike the reasonable
investor-"someone who grasps market fundamentals" 20 0 and can
gauge the accuracy of information by objective market signals-a rea-
sonable client will often lack any fundamental understanding of the
subject matter of the representation and will be, to a greater extent,
dependent on the presentation and content of the lawyer's communi-
cation. 20 1 Indeed, Huang persuasively argues that the identity of the
speaker may be relevant in assessing materiality. 20 2 Applying Huang's
insight to the attorney-client communications context suggests that
197. Id. at 111.
198. Id. at 112.
199. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REv. 1, 25-29
(1984).
[P] olitical judgments are virtually inescapable . . .[and] even such tactful and
delicate counseling involves discretion, and every exercise of that discretion en-
tails making 'political' decisions. For even if the lawyer wanted to, the lawyer sim-
ply could not neutrally, objectively, inform the client what the probable legal
implications would be .... The very language and tone in which lawyers speak of
the law to their clients is a local political action that subtly reinforces or subverts
[the law].
Id. at 26-29. William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones's Case, 50 MD.
L. REv. 213 (1991) (noting that because it is hard to distinguish ajudgment that a client's
choice is autonomous from a judgment that a choice is in the client's best interests, a
lawyer often cannot avoid influencing a client when advising about his best interests).
200. Sachs, supra note 188, at 485.
201. See supra notes 114, 199.
202. "[S]ecurities customers may be more trusting of and so more subject to securities
brokers engaging in puffery to induce moody investing than securities customers are in dan-
ger of securities issuers engaging in puffery to induce moody investing." Huang, supra note
187, at 116 (emphasis added).
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because clients are likely to be trusting of lawyers, 20 3 and because law-
yers cannot avoid influencing clients,20 4 a more rigorous standard of
materiality should apply to communications between attorneys and
clients.
Finally, David Hoffman finds empirical evidence that suggests
that courts implicitly equate investors' reasonableness with economic
rationality and unreasonableness with irrationality. 20 5 He argues that
behavioral law and economics establishes that investors do not act ra-
tionally,20 6 and thus concludes that courts are not using materiality to
reflect actual investor conduct "but instead to change the behavior
of... ordinary investors [who] ... will have strong incentives to con-
form their conduct to that deemed reasonable by courts."20 7 Hoff-
man, thus, asserts that courts are imposing on shareholders a duty to
be rational, rather than a duty to be reasonable.
In the context of the attorney-client relationship the risk of courts
using materiality to collapse reasonableness into rationality is not as
significant as it in the securities context. Clients may certainly be rea-
sonable, but may not be rational in the economic sense. For example,
a client may choose to bring a claim for a declaratory judgment be-
cause he wishes to have his day in court and be heard, which may be
reasonable even if the client seeks no monetary compensation and
therefore, in a narrow sense, is being irrational. Nor should lawyers or
courts paternalistically encourage clients to be rational as opposed to
reasonable. Specifically, however, the doctrines by which courts
equate reasonableness and rationality in the securities context-puff-
ery, the "bespeaks" doctrine, zero price change, and truth on the mar-
ket 2 0 8-are not applicable to the attorney-client relationship. Thus,
the use of materiality does not entail the risk of promoting clients'
rationality at the expense of reasonableness.
4. A Proposed Materiality-Based Communications Rule
Taking clients seriously and pursuing the ideal of principal-cli-
ents who exercise informed decision-making authority regarding the
objectives of the attorney-client relationship requires abandoning the
Rules' asymmetric communications regime. Instead, the Rules should
203. See supra note 114.
204. Gordon, supra note 199.
205. David A. Hoffman, The "Duty" to be a Rational Shareholder, 90 MINN. L. REv. 537, 542
(2006).
206. Id. at 586-94.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 586-95.
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adopt a materiality-based communications rule that would ensure that
clients receive all information a reasonable client would consider rele-
vant for his decision regarding the objectives of the relationship, that
is, all facts that would be viewed by a reasonable client as significantly
altering the total mix of information made available to him by his at-
torney. Accordingly, the current Rule 1.4 should be revised as follows:
Proposed Revised Rule 1.4
A lawyer shall:
(a) promptly inform the client of any material information
relating to the representation.
(b) (1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circum-
stance with respect to which the client's informed consent, as de-
fined in Rule 1.0(e), is required by these Rules;
(2) reasonably consult with the client about the means by
which the client's objectives are to be accomplished;
(3) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of
the matter;
(4) promptly comply with reasonable requests for informa-
tion; and
(5) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on
the lawyer's conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects
assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or
other law.
(c) A lawyer shall explain material information including a
matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to
make informed decisions regarding the representation.
Proposed subsection (a) incorporates the materiality standard
into the communications Rule. Proposed subsection (b) is identical to
current Rule 1.4(a). 20 9 Proposed subsection (c) revises current subsec-
tion 1.4(b) to mandate explanation of all material information, as op-
posed to mere explanation of a matter.210 Combined, subsections (a)
and (c) ensure that material meta and set-up information will be com-
municated to clients, whereas subsections (b) and (c) mandate com-
munications of material representation-specific information.
A new subsection, 1.0(O),211 will add a definition of materiality
consistent with the Court's definition in TSC Industries.21 2 Further-
209. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a) (2007).
210. Whereas current subsection 1.4 mandates explanation of "a matter," see MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4(b), proposed subsection 1.4(c) requires explanation of
"material information including a matter." Id. at R. 1.4(c).
211. Rule 1.0 defines the terminology used in the Rules, and currently lists (n) terms of
art. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0. A new definition of materiality is thus
referred to as subsection 1.0(o).
212. TSC Indus. Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
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more, the following proposed new comments will clarify the meaning
of the proposed revised communications Rule.
PROPOSED ADDITIONAL COMMENTS TO RULE 1.4:
[i] Whether information meets the materiality requirement de-
pends on the circumstances. Relevant factors include the nature and
scope of the relationship and the client's level of knowledge and
sophistication.
[ii] The timing and context of communication are also relevant
in determining materiality. At the commencement stage of a relation-
ship, information regarding the lawyer's qualifications is material. For
example, in assessing the qualifications of a newly admitted and rela-
tively inexperienced attorney, a reasonable client would want to know
how many times the newly admitted attorneys had taken the bar exam
before passing it, whereas the same information is not material for an
experienced attorney. Similarly, a reasonable client would want to
know when deciding whether to hire an attorney whether the attorney
has been disciplined or found liable for malpractice, whereas when
the relationship is ongoing, facts regarding the filing of new discipli-
nary complaints or of lawsuits seeking liability for malpractice may not
be material unless they have consequences that can affect the repre-
sentation of the client.
[iii] Information may become material depending on develop-
ments relating to the representation of a client. For example, the fact
that a lawyer made a mistake in representing a client will ordinarily
not be material. If the mistake, however, has consequences that mate-
rially affect the client's matter, the fact of the mistake becomes mate-
rial, and must be disclosed to the client. Moreover, such a
development also makes it mandatory to disclose to the client that the
client may have a malpractice cause of action against the attorney.
Similarly, general observations about how a lawyer may exercise her
discretion about exceptions to confidentiality (a "Miranda" warning)
are not ordinarily material. However, if developments in the represen-
tation lead the lawyer to entertain disclosure of confidential client in-
formation, then whether and how the lawyer plans to exercise her
discretion to reveal confidential client information becomes material
and must be communicated to the client promptly.
[iv] A lawyer may limit the scope of communications if the limita-
tion is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives in-
formed consent. For example, a lawyer may not inform the client
about pending discipline and malpractice liability if the information
Winter 2008] ATTORNEY-CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
has no material impact on the representation of the client and the
client gives informed consent.
[v] Information about fees is usually material and must be com-
municated to the client, see Rule 1.5.
[vi] Information about resolution of possible disputes between
attorney and client stemming from the relationship and the method
by which such disputes are to be resolved is ordinarily material.
Jane Austen reminds us that all communications entail some inac-
curacies and omit some relevant pieces of information. The proposed
materiality-based rule respects Ms. Austen's wisdom. It rejects an "ab-
solute and perfect candor" standard of communication as impractical
and inefficient. The proposed rule also rejects the current Rules' ap-
proach to communications which institutes an asymmetric exchange
of information and fails to live up to the promise of Rule 1.2-to
adopt a client-centered vision and empower clients as principals in the
attorney-client relationship. The proposed standard strikes an appro-
priate balance, ensuring that clients receive the appropriate quantity
and quality of information from their attorneys.
5. The Proposed Rule in Action: Communications
Regarding Malpractice Coverage
Must or should an attorney tell a client if she does not carry mal-
practice liability coverage? Must or should a lawyer advise a client if
she falls out of coverage during the relationship? These interrelated
questions have generated significant debate and regulatory reform in
recent years. 213 Whether an attorney carries, or falls out of, malprac-
tice coverage is a question involving meta facts. The difficulty exper-
ienced by the various jurisdictions in reaching a consensus answer
stems from the fact that the issue is one of first impression-the Rules
213. No less than twenty-threejurisdictions have contemplated revising their communi-
cations rules to require disclosure of malpractice insurance coverage information to cli-
ents. The controversy resulted in a split among the jurisdictions. A minority, at least five
jurisdictions, have revised their communications rule to explicitly require communications
regarding malpractice insurance coverage to clients (Alaska, New Hampshire, Ohio, Penn-
sylvania, and South Dakota). A majority, at least fourteen jurisdictions, have revised their
annual registration rules to require disclosure of malpractice insurance coverage informa-
tion on the annual registration statement, but not directly to clients (Arizona, Delaware,
Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia). Finally, at least four jurisdictions are
still contemplating changes (California, Michigan, New York, and Utah). See Am. Bar
Ass'n Ctr. for Prof l Responsibility, State Implementation of ABA Model Court Rule of
Insurance Disclosure, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/clientpro/malprac_disc_chart.pdf (last
visited Feb. 4, 2008) for links to all states' rules of professional conduct.
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simply do not regulate meta facts and offer no guidance regarding
disclosure of malpractice coverage information.2 1 4 The proposed ma-
teriality rule offers helpful guidance in resolving this thorny issue.
A straightforward application of the proposed materiality stan-
dard suggests that an attorney must inform a client that the attorney
does not carry malpractice liability coverage if a reasonable client
would find that information important when making a decision re-
garding the relationship.21 5
Whether a reasonable client would find important the fact that
an attorney does not carry malpractice liability insurance depends on
the circumstances. On the one hand, whether an attorney carries mal-
practice coverage is relevant to the retention decision because it gives
the client some assurance that should the lawyer act negligently the
client may be able to collect damages.21 6 The fact of coverage or lack
214. In 2002, the ABA Standing Committee on Client Protection contemplated a pro-
posed Rule 1.4 change but abandoned it after a tepid response from state and local bar
associations. See Am. Bar Ass'n Standing Comm. on Client Prot., Proposed Amendment to
Rule 1.4 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct to Provide for the Disclosure of
Lack of Professional Liability Insurance (Aug. 2002) (on file with author). Instead, in 2004,
the Committee endorsed and the ABA approved a Model Court Rule on Insurance Disclo-
sure, requiring not attorney disclosure to clients of malpractice information, but annual
certification to the "highest court of thejurisdiction." See Am. Bar Ass'n, Model Court Rule
on Ins. Disclosure, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/clientpro/malprac-disc-rule.pdf (last vis-
ited Feb. 4, 2008).
215. While the current communications regime does not invoke the materiality stan-
dard, commentaries have resorted to the language of materiality in support of their respec-
tive positions. See, e.g., Nicholas A. Marsh, Note, "Bonded & Insured?". The Future of
Mandatory Insurance Coverage and Disclosure Rules for Kentucky Attorneys, 92 Ky. LJ. 793, 809
(2004) ("Ultimately, the court's decision will turn on whether an attorney's lack of mal-
practice insurance is information necessary to the client's decision regarding representa-
tion."); Mignone, supra note 79, at 1088 ("The client needs to make fully informed
decisions, which includes information about whether an attorney has secured professional
liability insurance. The attorney's greater access to knowledge obligates him to keep the
client informed, and ultimately, protected.") (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAwYERs § 20 cmt. c (2000) (requiring attorneys to fully discuss matters with
client because the client may not fully comprehend the extent of what he does not know));
Farbod Solaimani, Note, Watching the Client's Back: A Defense of Mandatory Insurance Disclosure
Laws, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 963 (2006) ("It is safe to say that the average legal services
consumer expects to be protected by insurance against damage caused by his lawyer's pro-
fessional malpractice.") ; James E. Towery, The Case in Favor of Mandatory Disclosure of Lack of
Malpractice Insurance, 29 VT. BJ. 35, 36 (2003) ("The lawyer's lack of insurance is a material
fact that the client is entitled to know. Disclosure of material information is an obligation
stemming from a state endorsed monopoly over legal services.").
216. This is, of course, subject to the type of policy covering the liable attorney. Nicole
Cunitz succinctly summarizes the two common varieties of liability insurance.
The first is an occurrence policy which protects the lawyer from acts and omis-
sions for the duration of coverage regardless of when the claims are asserted. The
second is a claims-made policy which protects the attorney only during the period
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thereof may also allow the client to draw an inference regarding the
lawyer's qualifications and professional record, assuming that failure
to carry coverage may be the result of past negligence or discipline
that render the premium prohibitively expensive.
On the other hand, the insights a client may gain from the fact of
coverage or lack thereof are inherently uncertain and complex. First,
even if the client prevails in a malpractice lawsuit against the attorney,
he may not be able to collect against the insurance. 217 Most profes-
sional policies are "claims-made" based rather than "occurrence"
based. In other words, the policies cover claims according to when the
claim is made, not based on when the underlying conduct occurred.
Consequently, a policy that is in place at the retention stage may not
cover a claim made later on.2 18 Second, whether an attorney carries
malpractice coverage gives a client only limited information regarding
the lawyer's qualifications. The lawyer may, for example, fail to carry
malpractice coverage not because she has been found liable and can-
not find an insurer, but rather because no coverage is available in the
jurisdiction, no coverage is available given the subject matter of the
representation, or the attorney cannot afford to purchase insurance.
Proposed subsection 1.4(c) addresses these concerns regarding
the complex nature of information relating to malpractice coverage.
In explaining to the client the consequences of whether or not the
attorney carries malpractice coverage the lawyer will explain the na-
ture of the coverage to the client to the extent reasonably necessary
for the client to make an informed retention decision. Thus, arguing
that "the rule would likely result in disseminating directly to clients, at
considerable cost, information they are likely to misunderstand"219
misses the point. If clients are likely to misunderstand the conse-
of coverage and only if the attorney had no knowledge of potential claims when
he applied for coverage. This latter policy is the most common form of insurance
coverage for lawyers.
Nicole A. Cunitz, Mandatory Malpractice Insurance for Lauyers: Is There a Possibility of Public
Protection Without Compulsion? 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 637, 648 (1995) (citing Robert T.
Reid, Lauyers' Malpractice Insurance Coverage in the United States, 265 PLI/REAL 121 (1985)).
Thus if an attorney has a claims-made policy, but falls out of coverage, a client may not be
able to collect even if the claim relates back to when the lawyer was covered.
217. Rodney Snow, Is Mandatory Disclosure in Your Fee Letter That You Do Not Carry Mal-
practice Insurance a Sound Idea? 18 UTAH B.J. 12 (2005).
218. See Cunitz, supra note 216, at 648. Moreover, even if a policy is in place, a client
may not be able to collect against it because professional liability policies typically set limits
for coverage. When informing the client whether the lawyer carries coverage, the lawyer
will explain the applicable limits pursuant to proposed subsection 1.4(c).
219. George A. Berman, Mandatory Insurance Disclosure: A Solution in Search of a Problem,
49 B.B.J. 31, 32 (2005).
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quences of malpractice coverage insurance the solution ought to be to
make sure clients' possible misapprehensions are corrected, not to pa-
ternalistically fix the problem by not disclosing material information
to them. The Court's language in Basic is instructive on this point:
It assumes that investors are nitwits, unable to appreciate-even
when told-that mergers are risky propositions .... Disclosure,
and not paternalistic withholding of accurate information, is the
[desirable] policy .... The role of the materiality requirement is
not to "attribute to investors a child-like simplicity, an inability to
grasp the probabilistic significance of negotiations ... but to filter
out essentially useless information that a reasonable investor would
not consider significant, even as part of a larger mix of factors to
consider in making his investment decision," regarding the
relationship. 220
Similarly, for lawyers to assume that clients are unable to compre-
hend and appreciate the consequences and meaning of complex mal-
practice coverage information, even when offered a detailed
explanation pursuant to proposed Rule 1.4(c), would constitute unac-
ceptable paternalistic withholding of material information.
To be sure, informing the client about whether the attorney car-
ries malpractice liability coverage at the outset may have a chilling
effect on the relationship because it highlights the possibility of a con-
tentious dispute between attorney and client. Such a disclosure might
also suggest the possibility that the attorney may be negligent or in-
competent, and to some extent, "poison" the lawyer-client relation-
ship by forcing attorneys to disclose at the outset whether they have a
certain amount of insurance, thus compromising trust.2 21 Such a chil-
ling effect is certainly not in the best interest of the attorney nor of the
client, as it may make it harder to establish the trust and loyalty in the
relationship essential for an effective representation. Nonetheless, the
information is material and must be communicated to the client. The
chilling effect malpractice coverage information may have on the rela-
tionship is nothing more than an analogous example of the complex
information the Court was considering in Basic.
While communications regarding malpractice coverage will gen-
erally be material, under some circumstances such information will
not be covered by proposed Rule 1.4. For example, an attorney who
has sufficient assets to cover possible liability need not communicate
220. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 234 (1988) (internal citations omitted).
221. Christopher Lilienthal, Mandatory Disclosure of Legal Malpractice Coverage is Proposed
by High Court's Disciphnary Board, PA. L. WKLY., Aug. 15, 2005, at 1; Mignone, supra note 79,
at 1107-08 ("Debates of the late 1970s focused on how disclosure to clients creates mistrust
and jeopardizes the relationship . . ").
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failure to carry, or falling out of, coverage because the information is
not material. Similarly, a large law firm which decides to self-insure its
own attorneys and has sufficient funds to do so need not communi-
cate lack of insurance to the client.
Once again, the Court's analysis in Basic is highly relevant here.
Applying the Court's probability-magnitude test for materiality in the
context of preliminary merger talks, 222 in order to assess the
probability that malpractice information will be material, a fact-finder
will need to look to indicia of client interest. For example, the court
may examine whether the client is likely to file a malpractice lawsuit
given the nature of the relationship between attorney and client, or
whether the client is likely to succeed in a malpractice lawsuit given
the elements of the cause of action. The Basic Court, however, found
that:
To assess the magnitude of the transaction to the issuer of the se-
curities allegedly manipulated, a factfinder will need to consider
such facts as the size of the two corporate entities and of the poten-
tial premiums over market value. No particular event or factor
short of closing the transaction need be either necessary or suffi-
cient by itself to render merger discussions material. 223
A fact finder assessing the magnitude of malpractice information
to the client can consider such facts as the size of the policy limits
relative to the size of client's claim. Analogous to the Court's analysis,
no particular event or factor relating to the attorney-client relation-
ship need be either necessary or sufficient by itself.
In conclusion, mandating disclosure of malpractice information
regardless of its materiality, a course adopted recently in several
states, 224 constitutes unnecessary overreaching regulation. A material-
ity-based communications rule, in contrast, strikes the appropriate bal-
ance between providing clients with information relevant to their
exercise of informed judgment as principals in the relationship and
allowing lawyers to exercise professional judgment and withhold dis-
closing useless information. In the context of malpractice coverage
information, the proposed materiality communication rule will gener-
ally mandate disclosure to clients. Unlike a rule mandating such dis-
222. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 238 ("Under such circumstances, materiality 'will depend at
any given time upon a balancing of both the indicated probability that the event will occur
and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the company activity."'
(quoting SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc))).
223. Id. at 239.
224. See supra note 213.
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closure, however, the materiality-based rule will not mandate
communication where the information will be useless to clients.
22 5
Conclusion
Attorney-client communications have come along way, from no
communications rule under the Canons, to fragmented sections refer-
encing communications in the Model Code, to a short communica-
tions rule in the Model Rules, and finally the current, more detailed
Rule 1.4. Moreover, given the Rules' general resistance to change,226
the fact that Rule 1.4 is an integral part of a greater asymmetric com-
munications apparatus orchestrated by the Rules and the incremental
nature of revisions to the Rules when they do occur,227 Rule 1.4 in its
current format has probably gone as far as it ever will.
225. In recent debates across states contemplating revising their communication rules
to require disclosure of malpractice coverage information, a seemingly compelling argu-
ment against requiring such disclosure has been that mandatory disclosure will effectively
amount to requiring malpractice insurance. According to this argument, once clients ob-
tain information about malpractice coverage, they will likely retain only lawyers who are
covered by insurance. As a result, all lawyers will attempt to purchase insurance. The de-
bate then quickly turns to whether requiring malpractice coverage is desirable and plausi-
ble. See Nancy Blodgett, Forced Insurance: States Weigh Malpractice Rules, 71 A.B.A. J. 37
(1985); Cunitz, supra note 216, at 646-57; Robert W. Martin, Jr., Mandatory Legal Malprac-
tice Insurance: Is It on the Horizon? 25 VT. B.J. & L. DIG. 10 (1999); Lilienthal, supra note 221,
at 1; Debra Cassens Moss, Going Bare: Practicing Without Malpractice Insurance, 73 A.B.A. J. 82
(1987); Ramos, supra note 139, at 1725-30; Solaimani, supra note 215, at 967-74; see gener-
ally Benjamin Franklyn Boyer & Gary Conner, Legal Malpractice and Compulsory Client Protec-
tion, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 835 (1978).
This critique fundamentally underestimates the power of effective attorney-client com-
munications. It erroneously assumes that the practical consequence of mandating disclo-
sure of material information (and thus in some circumstances of insurance coverage
information) will lead clients to drop uninsured lawyers and consequently impose a de
facto mandatory insurance requirement. The argument seems to treat clients, in the words
of the Court, as "nitwits." If clients drop uninsured lawyers because they reasonably believe
insurance to be materially important, then lawyers ought to respect the judgment of clients
in this regard. Furthermore, if clients decide not to retain uninsured lawyers because they
misunderstand the implications of lack of insurance, then the lawyer did not adequately
communicate and explain the issue to the client.
226. The ABA Model Code replaced the Canons in 1969 and was itself superseded by
the Model Rules in 1983, fourteen years later. See supra note 7. The Model Rules were
significantly revised after nearly twenty years by the Ethics 2000 reform. Id. It would seem
then that another major reform of the Rules is not likely before the year 2020 or so.
227. Tellingly, the Chair's Introduction to Ethics 2000 states:
There was also a strong countervailing sense that there was much to be valued in
the existing concepts and articulation of the Model Rules. The Commission con-
cluded early on that these valuable aspects of the Rules should not be lost or put
at risk in our revision effort. As a result, the Commission set about to be compre-
hensive, but at the same time conservative, and to recommend change only where
necessary. In balancing the need to preserve the good with the need for improve-
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Attorney-client communications, however, have not come far
enough. In order to live up to the agency ideal of installing clients as
principals who fully participate in and exercise authority over the rela-
tionship, and to sustain the legitimacy of the non-accountability prin-
ciple, the Rules must abandon their one-way communications regime
and adopt a communications rule that will mandate the disclosure of
all material information relating to the representation. Such a rule
will correct for the Rules' systematic failure to regulate meta and set-
up facts and would ensure that clients receive all material facts neces-
sary for the exercise of informed decision-making.
ment, we were mindful of Thomas Jefferson's words of nearly 185 years ago, in a
letter concerning the Virginia Constitution, that "moderate imperfections had
better be borne with; because, when once known, we accommodate ourselves to
them, and find practical means of correcting their ill effects."
Veasey, supra note 9 (emphasis added).
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